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This Article establishes the subject of federal administrative investigations as a new area 
of study in administrative law.  While the literature has addressed investigations by specific 
agencies and congressional investigations, there is no general account for the trans-substantive 
constitutional value of administrative investigations.  This Article provides such an account by 
exploring the positive law, agency behaviors, and constraints pertaining to this unresearched 
field.  It concludes with some urgency that the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946—the 
statute that stands as a bill of rights for the Administrative State—does not serve to regulate 
administrative investigations and that the Article III courts have held that such agency behavior 
is essentially unreviewable since the mid-twentieth century.  It identifies the historical guideposts 
of administrative investigations and analyzes the substantial power agencies wield when they 
investigate.  It surveys and analyzes the limiting principles in law that operate as nominal 
constraints to unlawful administrative investigative behavior.  This Article concludes by 
considering procedural and substantive constraints that could be implemented to align agency 
investigations with constitutional and statutory norms without sacrificing their ability to fulfill 
their critical missions for the American public. 
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Almost uniformly, federal agencies investigate.  Armed with broad or vague mandates, 
agencies investigate matters within their purview that they might be able to enforce or regulate.  
This domain is shrouded in considerable mystery.  The final agency action following an 
investigation does not always disclose the full extent of the agency’s inquiry.  If agencies decline 
to act on the results of an investigation, the public will likely never know that it took place, aside 
from the targets of the investigation or third parties who receive agency requests for information 
under the threat of compulsion, such as subpoenas or warrants. 
The full extent of an agency investigation can be fearsome.  The Federal Trade 
Commission (“FTC”) doggedly investigated a company called LabMD, which cost the business 
millions to defend and ultimately caused its shuttering.1  Under the strain of a multiyear FTC 
investigation, LabMD saw its revenue halved over the course of a year and its insurers refuse to 
renew the company’s policies.2  In January 2014, the CEO shut down the company due to the 
“psychological warfare the FTC did on the company,” which included hammering LabMD with 
continual demands which relented only upon settlement.3  Part of the cost to LabMD came from 
protracted litigation spurred by allegedly falsified information that a cyber-security firm gave the 
government,4 and allegations that a Big Law firm covered up for that firm.5  A House Oversight 
Committee report later concluded that the FTC had sacrificed “good government” in using a 
conflicted third party’s leads to “obtain information validating its regulatory authority” and 
providing the third party with “actionable information that it exploited for monetary gain.”6   
Whether deployed nobly or not, agency investigative tools are powerful and merit 
examination.  This Article reveals and probes federal agency investigations, their legal 
foundation and constraints, and how the People can act to improve agency behavior.  Our 
nuanced inquiry into administrative investigations is the first of its kind.7  Despite the richness, 
 
1 Dune Lawrence, A Leak Wounded This Company.  Fighting the Feds Finished It Off, 




4 Joel Schectman, Exclusive: DOJ Probes Allegations that Tiversa Lied to FTC about Data 
Breaches, REUTERS (Mar. 17, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tiversa-doj-probe-
exclusive-idUSKCN0WK027. 
5 Kathryn Rubino, Biglaw Firm Accused of Covering Up for Hacker, ABOVE THE LAW (May 8, 
2018), https://abovethelaw.com/2018/05/biglaw-firm-accused-of-covering-up-for-hacker/. 
6 Lawrence, supra note 1; see also Alison Frankel, There’s a Big Problem for the FTC Lurking 
in 11th Circuit’s LabMD Data-Security Ruling, REUTERS (June 7, 2018), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-otc-labmd/theres-a-big-problem-for-the-ftc-lurking-in-11th-
circuits-labmd-data-security-ruling-idUSKCN1J32S2. 
7 The last article that appears to have addressed the general topic of agency investigations was 
written in 1985.  John W. Bagby, Administrative Investigations: Preserving a Reasonable 
Balance Between Agency Powers and Target Rights, 23 AM. BUS. L.J. 319 (1985).  Professor 
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ubiquity, and importance of administrative investigations, it has never been studied in depth.  
Others have obliquely touched on the some of the topics that this Article squarely addresses.8  
The Supreme Court has recently addressed the scope of administrative warrants and subpoenas,9 
but it has not examined the foundation of its modern jurisprudence for evaluating the lawfulness 
of agency investigations or to develop a touchstone for agencies and the public.  Instead, the 
Court catalyzed the flourishment of a highly deferential standard that rarely results in the 
quashing of agency investigative action or the exercise of agency self-restraint.  The Court has 
also refrained from acknowledging that the foundations of its earlier cases have been eroded by 
more recent developments in both constitutional law and administrative law. 
Our research has led us to conclude that courts are not using the Fourth Amendment to 
meaningfully rein in agency investigative excesses, and that courts are not using the 
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (“APA”) at all to regulate agency investigative behavior.  
Courts have consistently held that investigative behavior is unreviewable for lack of finality.  
The following chart displays how administrative investigations are not constrained by positive 
procedures or judicial review under the APA. 
 
Judicially Recognized Positive APA Procedures and Article III Review of Administrative Behaviors  



















No10 No, save for 
§ 555(e)11 
§§ 554, 556, 
557 
§ 553 § 553 §§ 553, 556, 
557 
Reviewable 
under § 704? 
Rarely Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Philip Hamburger has discussed “Inquisitorial Process” and “Prerogative Orders and Warrants” 
in a historical lens, but has not engaged on this general topic.  Philip Hamburger, IS 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 157–90 (2014).  See also, Mila Sohoni, Crackdowns, 31 VA. 
L. REV. 31 (2017) (on enforcement discretion); Zachary Price, Enforcement Discretion and 
Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671 (2014) (same). 
8 See, e.g., MICHAEL ASIMOW, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION 
OUTSIDE THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (2019), 
https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Federal%20Administrative%20Adj%20Outsi
de%20the%20APA%20-%20Final.pdf.   
9 See, e.g., McLane Co. v. EEOC, 137 S. Ct. 1159, 1166-70 (2017) (holding that a district court’s 
decision to enforce or quash an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission administrative 
subpoena is reviewed for abuse of discretion, not de novo, with reference to “longstanding 
practice of the courts of appeals in reviewing a district court’s decision to enforce or quash an 
administrative subpoena”). 
10 No federal court has held that administrative investigative behavior is reviewable on its face. 
11 Butte Cty. v. Hogen, 613 F.3d 190, 194 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (concluding that under 5 U.S.C. 
§ 555(e), “the agency must provide an interested party . . . with a brief statement of the grounds 
for denial” in an informal adjudication). 
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This Article first analyzes the evolution of the Supreme Court’s treatment of investigative 
actions and concludes that the U.S. Constitution provides no meaningful barrier to such exercises 
of investigative power.  It identifies and analyzes how the APA never regulated the civil 
investigative conduct of agencies.  To aid this Article’s navigation into these uncharted waters, 
Part II looks into the history of agency investigations to see whether and how they have been 
constrained.  Here we fashion a working definition to use as a foundation for our examination.  
Part III surveys the range of agency investigative techniques and showcases the degree of power 
agencies wield when they investigate. 
Part IV analyzes the efficacy of checks on agency investigatory abuses.  These checks 
manifest in hard and soft forms.  Hard constraints, like the APA and the Bill of Rights, provide 
direct avenues for inappropriately-investigated individuals to seek judicial redress.  Soft 
constraints, like the separation of powers principle of the Constitution and Congress’s powers of 
oversight and the purse, merit discussion but are less directly able to contain abusive 
investigations.  Likewise, the exercise of executive branch self-restraint is a suboptimal solution 
due to a durability deficit.  Our research leads us to conclude that there are minimal barriers 
applied throughout the federal government under the innumerable administrative statutory 
schemes that facilitate investigations and that any enlargement of prosecutorial behavior in light 
of new technologies could evolve to an unanticipated and unprecedented total enforcement 
environment in portions of administrative law.  
To assess the desirability of heightened barriers, Part V examines how administrative 
investigations further the purpose of agencies in the constitutional order.  Proceeding from the 
conclusion that adequate restraints are lacking, this Part establishes why checks are needed on 
investigative actions by chronicling abuses and inefficiencies in agency investigations. 
Part VI identifies and analyzes potential solutions to unlawful investigative acts that 
could be utilized to calibrate agency investigations into constitutional and statutory norms 
without foreclosing agencies’ ability to lawfully execute their respective missions. 
II. TRACING ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATIONS 
A. Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Investigations 
 
As long as there has been civilized government, there has been executive investigation.12  
The concept of administrative investigations draws from this legacy.13  In medieval England, the 
 
12 1 Samuel 14:38 (“Saul said, ‘Draw near here, all you chiefs of the people, and investigate and 
see how this sin has happened today.’”). 
13 Kenneth Culp Davis, The Administrative Power of Investigation, 56 YALE L.J. 1111, 1111–14 
(1947) (beginning in biblical times and continuing through World War II and noting, “The story 
of the development of the administrative power of investigation is rather dramatic.”). 
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King’s chancellor, an administrative official, commonly issued writs as royal commands.14  
During the seventeenth century, the powerful Star Chamber issued broad warrants permitting 
searches of the papers of political suspects.15  Eighteenth-century England exercised 
administrative power in the form of general warrants, writs of assistance (e.g., authorizing 
customs searches).16  In colonial America, writs of assistance—that is, general search warrants—
were a major grievance that spurred the colonies to declare independence.17 
One of the first statutes explicitly authorizing agency investigations was the act creating 
the Steamboat Inspection Service in 1838,18 followed by the Interstate Commerce Commission 
Act in 1887.19  The courts struggled with what oversight to exercise over agency investigations.20  
The Supreme Court initially viewed with skepticism agencies’ ability to issue subpoenas, even 
upon congressional delegation.21  The majority opinion in Harriman v. Interstate Commerce 
Commission limited administrative subpoenas to “the cases where the sacrifice of privacy is 
necessary—those where the investigations concern a specific breach of law.”22  The Court 
reinforced the notions that agency investigative acts would be scrutinized carefully, by 
denouncing a “general, roving, offensive, inquisitorial, compulsory investigation, conducted by a 
commission without any allegations, upon no fixed principles, and governed by no rules of law, 
or of evidence, and no restrictions except its own will, or caprice.”23  Into the 1920s, the Court 
 
14 John A. Hamill, Sr., EPA Administrative Investigative Tools: An Inside Perspective, 4 J. 
ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 85, 86–87 (1989) (discussing how writs were “an executive, not a judicial, 
invention,” arising after the Norman conquest of 1066 and commonly issued by the King’s 
chancellor and other administrative officials). 
15 Osmond K. Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and Seizures, 34 HARV. L. REV. 361, 362 (1921). 
16 Philip Hamburger, Early Prerogative and Administrative Power: A Response to Paul Craig, 
81 MO. L. REV. 939, 952 (2016). 
17 Davis, supra note 13, at 1111–14. 
18 5 Stat. 304 (1838).  This act provided for inspections of hulls, boilers, and the like.  Id. §§ 3–6; 
see Jerry L. Mashaw, Administration and “The Democracy”: Administrative Law from Jackson 
to Lincoln, 1829-1861, 117 YALE L.J. 1568, 1633 (2008). 
19 KRISTIN E. HICKMAN & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 8.1 (6th ed. 
2019) (citing 24 Stat. 379, 383 (1887)). 
20 Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Administrative War, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1343, 1401–08 
(2014); Donald R.C. Pongrace, Requirement of Notice of Third-Party Subpoenas Issued in SEC 
Investigations: A New Limitation on the Administrative Subpoena Power, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 701, 
709–16 (1984) (discussing how the Supreme Court initially erected a high hurdle for agencies to 
issue administrative subpoenas); HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 19, § 8.1 (similar). 
21 Donald R.C. Pongrace, Requirement of Notice of Third-Party Subpoenas Issued in SEC 
Investigations: A New Limitation on the Administrative Subpoena Power, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 701, 
709–10 (1984). 
22 Harriman v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 211 U.S. 407, 419–20 (1908). 
23 Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1, 27 (1936) (quoting In re Pac. Ry. Comm’n, 32 F. 241, 263 
(C.C.N.D. Cal. 1887)). 
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reiterated its disapproval of “fishing expeditions into private papers on the possibility that they 
may disclose evidence of crime.24 
But the Supreme Court’s attitude shifted after the New Deal established new and varied 
agencies with complex missions.25  After World War II, and in near-contemporaneity with the 
enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, the Court decided a body of cases that 
recalibrated the baseline judicial scrutiny of agency investigations as highly deferential.  These 
seminal cases—which are examined in depth by this Article—include Oklahoma Press 
Publishing Co. v. Walling26 and  United States v. Morton Salt Co.27   
In Oklahoma Press Publishing, the U.S. Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division 
issued subpoenas to two newspaper publishers it was investigating for violating the Fair Labor 
Standards Act.28  The publishers resisted the subpoenas, arguing that the Division failed to 
comply with the Fourth Amendment and demonstrate the probable cause necessary to enforce 
the subpoenas.29  The Supreme Court rejected that argument and dismissed the publishers’ 
concerns about executive “general fishing expeditions into [their] books, records and papers, in 
order to secure evidence that they have violated the Act,” holding that “the records in these cases 
present no question of actual search and seizure” but were only “constructive” searches.30  For 
such constructive searches, the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause requirement was satisfied 
simply “by the court’s determination that the investigation is authorized by Congress, is for a 
purpose Congress can order and the documents sought are relevant to the inquiry.”31  Oklahoma 
Press Publishing thus ruled that the Fourth Amendment protects regulated parties only so far as 
Congress has explicitly limited agencies’ subpoena authorities.32  Because the Fair Labor 
Standards Act’s “language leaves no room to doubt that Congress intended to authorize just what 
the Administrator did and sought have the courts do,” the publishers’ claims failed.33  The 
opinion also took particular note of the “corporate character” of the publishers’ records, implying 
that the Fourth Amendment’s protections were especially attenuated in that circumstance.34   
Justice Murphy dissented alone, inveighing against all uses of administrative subpoenas and 
alluding to King George III as he worried administrative subpoenas were vulnerable to 
“[e]xcessive use or abuse of authority.”35 
The Supreme Court returned to review the lawfulness of agency warrants four years later 
in Morton Salt Co., this time in a challenge to a Federal Trade Commission order requiring salt 
 
24 FTC v. Am. Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 306 (1924). 
25 Davis, supra note 13, at 1122. 
26 Okla. Press Pub’g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 209 (1946). 
27 United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950). 
28 Okla. Press Pub’g Co., 327 U.S. at 189. 
29 Id. at 189–90. 
30 Id. at 194–95, 202–05. 
31 Id. at 209. 
32 Id. at 197–202. 
33 Id. at 198. 
34 Id. at 204–08. 
35 Id. at 218–19 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
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producers and trade associations to file various and comprehensive reports and statements.36  The 
salters argued that the Commission’s order violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.37  
Building off of Oklahoma Press Publishing, including its dim view of the robustness of  business 
associations’ constitutional rights in this context, the Court held that “neither incorporated nor 
unincorporated associations can plead an unqualified right to conduct their affairs in secret.”38  
“Of course,” the Court recognized, the Constitution imposes some limits on what the 
Commission could demand.39  In addition to the limitations found in Oklahoma Press 
Publishing—that the type of agency request must be authorized by statute and the specific 
agency request must be “reasonably relevant”—the Supreme Court held that “the demand [must 
be] not too indefinite.”40  The Court summarily found that the Commission’s order, on its face, 
met those standards.41  Finally, the Court faulted the salters for not complaining directly to the 
Commission and asking it to modify the order: before quashing agency investigative acts as 
“arbitrarily excessive,” courts “may expect the supplicant to have made reasonable efforts before 
the Commission itself to obtain reasonable conditions.”42 
These two decisions had the effect of “further legitimizing the routine use of 
administrative subpoenas.”43  This regime was ushered in by new Justices with a more hospitable 
view of government intervention.44  The Supreme Court has not in recent years squarely 
addressed this issue or the standards that should apply to judicial review of agency investigatory 
techniques.45  Although the Supreme Court has not in recent years taken up the matter squarely, 
it has not done so for a lack of petitions for a writ of certiorari.  Several have been filed in the 
years since Morton Salt, asking the Court to overrule or diminish parts of that jurisprudence.46 
B. Defining Agency Investigative Acts 
The postwar Supreme Court cases involve perhaps the quintessential agency investigative 
act, subpoenas.  But subpoenas are just one example of an agency investigative act.  A proper 
study of investigations requires us to define what agency investigative acts are, precisely.  The 
academy and courts have not coalesced on a comprehensive definition of an agency investigative 
act.  The Attorney General’s 1941 report on administrative procedure remarked, “Much that 
 
36 United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 636–37 (1950). 
37 Id. at 651. 
38 Id. at 652. 
39 Id. at 652, 653. 
40 Id. at 652. 
41 Id. at 653. 
42 Id. 
43 Cuéllar, supra note 20, at 1404. 
44 HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 19, § 8.1. 
45 See, e.g., id. § 8.2. 
46 See, e.g., Pet. for Writ of Certiorari, Koresko v. Chao, 2006 WL 1455400 (2006) (“Morton 
Salt and Powell are decades old, predating this Court’s jurisprudence on privacy rights.  
Subsequent statutory law has worn away the main thread of the holdings—that government 
inquiries must be presumed legitimate.”). 
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occurs at a hearing or conference is conditioned by the investigation of the problem which may 
have preceded it, or of which the hearing may be a part.”47  Once Congress enacted the APA, 
which carried forward many existing administrative law practices, Professor Kenneth Culp Davis 
offered, “The Administrative Procedure Act to the contrary notwithstanding, administrative 
proceedings are not limited to rule-making, adjudication, and licensing.  Some administrative 
proceedings are investigations—proceedings designed to produce information.”48 
The Supreme Court has weighed in by providing a negative definition of an 
administrative investigation, concluding that an investigation is not a final agency action.49  An 
investigation “is not a definitive statement of position . . . [but only] represents a threshold 
determination that further inquiry is warranted . . .”50  The APA obliquely references “nonpublic 
investigatory proceeding[s]” and “investigative act[s],”51 but “provides no statutory definition or 
classification of different kinds of investigations.”52 
Nor do dictionaries provide helpful definitions.  Webster’s defines “investigate”—and the 
word’s derivatives, “investigatory,” “investigator,” and “investigation”—to mean “a systematic 
examination.”53  Other courts have turned to Black’s Law Dictionary’s definition, which focuses 
on the objective of the investigation: “[t]he activity of trying to find out the truth about 
something.”54  The Department of Justice has defined “regulatory investigations” similarly: 
“‘[R]egulatory investigations’… generally have as their objective regulatory compliance by 
private parties.”55  This demonstrates a parallel framework to Justice Stewart’s “I know it when I 
see it” approach.56   
Although there is no general, executive branch definition of administrative investigation, 
certain organic statutes give agencies binding definitions in some contexts.  For example, the 
Antitrust Civil Process Act provides: “[t]he term ‘antitrust investigation’ means any inquiry 
conducted by any antitrust investigator for the purpose of ascertaining whether any person is or 
 
47 ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, DEPARTMENT OF 
JUSTICE 111 (1941). 
48 Davis, supra note 13, at 1111; see also David C. Shonka, Responding to the Government’s 
Civil Investigations, 15 SEDONA CONF. J. 1, 1 (2014). 
49 FTC v. Std. Oil Co. of Cal., 449 U.S. 232, 241 (1980). 
50 Id. 
51 5 U.S.C. §§ 555(c), 554(d). 
52 John A. Hamill, Sr., EPA Administrative Investigative Tools: An Inside Perspective, 4 J. 
ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 85, 88 (1989) (footnotes omitted). 
53 Doe v. Rogers, 139 F. Supp. 3d 120, 137-38 (D.D.C. 2015). 
54 MusclePharm Corp. v. Liberty Ins. Underwriters, Inc., 712 F. App’x 745, 755 (10th Cir. 2017) 
(citing Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) and distinguishing “regulatory investigation” 
from “proceeding.”). 
55 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, Inspector General Authority to Conduct 
Regulatory Investigations, 13 U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel 54, 54 n.1, 1989 WL 595865, at *1 
n.1 (Mar. 9, 1989). 
56 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J. concurring) (applying such an 
approach to pornography). 
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has been engaged in any antitrust violation or in any activities in preparation for a merger, 
acquisition, joint venture, or similar transaction, which, if consummated, may result in an 
antitrust violation.”57  Similar statutory definitions for civil administrative investigation exist for 
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”)58 and the Federal Trade Commission 
(“FTC”).59  These definitions, too, are only general. 
We thus offer a definition of agency investigative acts: Executive branch agency 
exercises of civil examination or inquiry authority, taken in the absence of positive APA 
procedures, that carry the perceived, eventual, or actual threat of compulsion.60  We draw the 
term from the APA, which uses it, albeit glancingly and without definition.61 
Deconstructing such definition requires mapping agency behavior that precedes “agency 
action” as normatively understood in the APA in 5 U.S.C. § 704.62  The agency must be acting 
on some kind of formal or informal complaint, tip, internal targeting, or a defined trigger point, 
at which point the agency researches the facts necessary to sustain an agency action and decides 
whether to initiate such an action.63  If the type of agency action is an adjudication, then the 
investigation could enable the decision whether to adjudicate by enforcement against a specific 
party.  Here, investigation targets are not (yet) respondents or defendants in agency or civil 
actions, but akin to third-party witnesses, including third-party witnesses on notice of their 
potential status as a party-defendant.64  The goal is to determine whether agency action that 
would trigger normative § 704 finality is warranted.  
Our definition presumes that the purpose of agency investigation is to see whether some 
agency action may eventually be warranted, excepting when the investigation is preordained to 
produce a discrete outcome.  This comports with the Supreme Court’s 1946 statement that 
agency investigations aim to “discovery and procure evidence” to see if that evidence “should 
justify” bringing a charge or complaint.65  It also comports with the Court’s later distinction 
 
57 15 U.S.C. § 1311(c). 
58 12 U.S.C. § 5561.  The Supreme Court held that it was unconstitutional for the CFPB’s 
director to be removed only for cause. See Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 
2183 (2020).  Although the case focused primarily on the authorities of inferior officers of the 
United States, it arose in the context of CFPB attempting to enforce its civil investigatory 
authority against the respondent.  Id. at *6–7. 
59 15 U.S.C. § 57b-1. 
60 This definition comports with the only other attempted definition in the literature of which we 
are aware, Professor Davis’s comment that investigations are “designed to produce information.”  
Davis, supra note 13, at 1111. 
61 5 U.S.C. § 555(c). 
62 ASIMOW, supra note 8. 
63 E.g., 7 U.S.C. § 193(a) (describing the procedure for the Department of Agriculture to 
investigate, hear, and fine packers and swine contractors who have violated or may have violated 
the Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921”). 
64 FTC v. Compagnie De Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1310–11 (D.C. Cir. 
1980). 
65 Okla. Press Pub’g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 201 (1946). 
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between “determinations of a quasi-judicial nature”—i.e., adjudications—and “nonadjudicative, 
fact-finding investigations.”66  This definitional prong leaves out agency movement where 
agency action is remote, impossible, or forsworn.  For example, when the government seeks 
demographic data for the decennial census, the request’s purpose is not to make agency action.67 
A variety of sources can spark an investigation.  Some agencies could conduct an 
investigation as an exercise of its own discretion and on its own initiative.  For example, the 
CFPB may issue civil investigative demands to collect information “before the institution of any 
proceedings.”68  The agency might do so simply upon reading a news story,69 or just “merely on 
suspicion.”70 The agency might receive a tip or notification, perhaps from an inspector general or 
another federal agency like the Department of Justice.71  This may be because a private party 
files a charge with the agency and the agency is required to investigate (often within a 
timeframe) whether to file an administrative complaint.72  The agency may commence an 
investigation upon direction from the President.73  Congress may also issue a directive to 
investigate,74 for example, through a statute directing an agency to adopt rules within a certain 
number of days on a particular subject, which requires the agency to investigate what the rule 
should be.75 
 
66 Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 445–46 (1960). 
67 See 13 U.S.C. §§ 141, 181 (authorizing the Census Bureau to conduct decennial censuses and 
interim inquiries). 
68 12 U.S.C. § 5562(c)(1).  Each demand must “state the nature of the conduct constituting the 
alleged violation which is under investigation and the provision of law applicable to such 
violation.”  Id. § 5562(c)(2). 
69 Shonka, supra note 48, at 2. 
70 United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57 (1964). 
71 E.g., FED. ELECTION COMM’N, GUIDEBOOK FOR COMPLAINANTS AND RESPONDENTS ON THE 
FEC ENFORCEMENT PROCESS 8–9 (2012), https://transition.fec.gov/em/respondent_guide.pdf. 
72 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(d)(2) (the U.S. Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Division’s Immigrant 
and Employee Rights Section, which receives and investigates complaints of unfair immigration-
related employment practices); see also id. § 1324b(d)(1) (also permitting that Section to 
unilaterally investigate and file charges); 14 C.F.R. § 13.5(g)–(i) (similar, for Federal Aviation 
Administration complaints); 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(1); 11 C.F.R. § 111.4 (similar, for FEC 
complaints); 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (similar, for National Labor Relations Board complaints). 
73 E.g., Zeke Miller, President Trump Orders Intelligence Agencies to ‘Fully Cooperate’ With 
Investigation into Mueller Probe, TIME (May 24, 2019), https://time.com/5595248/donald-
trump-intelligence-russia/; Kaveh Waddell, Obama Orders Investigation into Election-Related 
Hacking, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 9, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/12/obama-orders-full-review-of-election-
related-hacking/510149/. 
74 Shonka, supra note 48, at 2. 
75 E.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 2056c(a); 22 U.S.C. § 5504(a); 25 U.S.C. § 1406(b), (c). 
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 Some agencies, like the Internal Revenue Service76 and Federal Election Commission,77 
exercise express discretion under their organic statute, commonly in the form of compliance 
checks or audits.  Such an investigation may follow a telephone call received on a tip line, a 
whistleblower complaint, or some reason for the agency to suspect a violation.  But even if the 
agency does not have a discrete reason to audit a party, it may employ a random audit78 to 
decrease the probability that violators can strategically evade enforcement.79  The audit might not 
be completely random.  An agency might pay attention to particular industries or fields under its 
regulatory purview.80  
Once the agency elects to investigate, there are a number of possible outcomes, all of 
which (under our definition) carry the perceived threat or actual consequence of compulsion.  
The agency may decide to commence an adjudication or rulemaking, although the adjudication 
may be the agency finding a liability yet declining to seek an immediate remedy.81  Conversely, 
the agency might decline to commence an adjudication or rulemaking for the time being.  An 
outcome from an agency investigation that yields an agency action could be a compliance action.  
For example, a grant-distributing agency must comply with its organic statute and the Office of 
Management and Budget’s various circulars via audits for compliance purposes.  Sometimes, 
there is the authority to engage in an audit outside the periodic time requirement in response to 
allegations or suspicion of fraud or bad action. 
An adjudication or rulemaking does not necessarily need to be the goal, however.  An 
agency could investigate for the purpose of discovering and logging “informal enforcement 
actions.”  For example, the EPA maintains Enforcement and Compliance History Online, which 
is a searchable, publicly accessible database about corporate violations, provides data on 
“informal enforcement actions.”82  An agency investigation might also result in management 
audits, where agencies work with regulated parties to ensure that regulated parties are prepared 
to follow the law.  Of course, to fall within our definition of “agency investigation,” the 
interaction between the agency and the regulated parties must at some point carry at minimum 
the perceived threat of coercion. 
So, what is not an agency civil investigation?  Negative definitions are helpful because 
the APA does not precisely or exhaustively define all forms of agency conduct or behavior.  
 
76 Audit Techniques Guides, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-
businesses-self-employed/audit-techniques-guides-atgs (last visited Dec. 17, 2020) (industry-
specific audit guidances). 
77 26 U.S.C. §§ 9007(a), 9008(g), 9038(a). 
78 Chaves Cnty. Home Health Serv., Inc. v. Sullivan, 931 F.2d 914, 916 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
79 See United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972); Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Auditing 
Executive Discretion, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 227, 299 (2006). 
80 Audit Techniques Guides, supra note 76. 
81 See, e.g., Rhea Lana, Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor, 824 F.3d 1023 (D.C. Cir. 2016).  
82 Enforcement and Compliance History Online, U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, https://echo.epa.gov/ 
(last visited Dec. 17, 2020).  An example page is here: Detailed Facility Report, 
https://echo.epa.gov/detailed-facility-report?fid=110070032218 (last visited Dec. 17, 2020). 
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Indeed, the APA is replete with negative definitions.83  The APA also hints at investigative 
functions without defining, positively or negatively, that term.84  Some courts have implied—
appropriately so, in our view—at investigative acts being categorically distinct from other types 
of “agency action,” including adjudications or rules.85 
Proceedings with positive APA procedures like rulemakings or adjudications are not 
agency investigations; our definition does not equate to everything leading up to, or just short of, 
the completion of rulemakings or adjudications.  For instance, we define agency investigations to 
exclude pre-decisional adjudicational and rulemaking processes where the decision to charge a 
party has been formally made and an impartial decisionmaker now has jurisdiction over the 
case.86  Although a neutral agency decisionmaker conducting hearings as part of the formal 
adjudication process is literally “investigating” a claim and assessing whether the complaint has 
merit, we exclude these types of proceedings because the agency is acting in a quasi-judicial 
role.  Such proceedings feature fewer problems, as we discuss below in Part V, and objections to 
agency abuses committed during the adjudicatory or rulemaking process can often be raised to an 
impartial decisionmaker.  Our definition thus requires that there be a lack of APA positive 
procedures, so the process of rulemaking and adjudication is not an “investigation.”87   
An agency investigation could result in collateral issues during and following agency 
action.  Instead of the agency deciding whom to pursue or whether to pursue someone, the 
agency could be deciding the size of a penalty.  For example, the Office of Thrift Supervision 
may assess civil fines against a party that violates banking laws or regulations or breaches a 
fiduciary duty.  In assessing fines, the agency, by statute, must consider mitigating factors like 
the size of the subpoenaed party’s financial resources.88  
 
83 The APA has a negative definition of informal adjudication as adjudication that is not formal.  
5 U.S.C. § 554(a); see also SecurityPoint Holdings, Inc. v. Transp. Sec. Admin., 769 F.3d 1184, 
1187–88 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (applying § 555(e) to informal adjudications).  Similarly, “agency” is a 
general definition with a number of negative carveouts.  5 U.S.C. § 551(1).  
84 See, e.g., id. § 554(d). 
85 United States v. W.H. Hodges & Co., 533 F.2d 276, 278 (5th Cir. 1976) (per curiam); see  
Sierra Club v. Peterson, 185 F.3d 349, 366 n.25 (5th Cir. 1999), on reh’g, 228 F.3d 559 (5th Cir. 
2000) (dicta). 
86 We have also structured our definition to exclude “enforcement actions.”  For example, in the 
SEC context, enforcement actions mean all the legal proceedings that the commission brings that 
would normatively be considered “final agency action” under the APA.  Urska Velikonja, 
Reporting Agency Performance: Behind the SEC’s Enforcement Statistics, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 
901, 903–04 (2016). 
87 This is because the APA provides the general contours of process for rulemaking and 
adjudication.  See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 556, 557. 
88 See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(2); In re Sealed Case (Admin. Subpoena), 42 F.3d 1412, 1416 (D.C. 
Cir. 1994). 
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Our affirmative definition covers only civil agency investigations.  Criminal 
investigations by agencies are a separate inquiry beyond the scope of this Article.89  Additional 
constitutional safeguards apply if the investigation is for a criminal offense, including if a civil 
investigation shifts into a criminal investigation.90  That said, criminal investigations are often 
intertwined with civil investigations and are frequently the outgrowth of an investigation that 
may have begun with a purely civil aim. 
Our definition excludes non-coercive action.91  While an agency investigation can be 
non-coercive or non-intrusive, this Article concerns only coercive or intrusive actions—or 
actions carrying the threat of possible future coercion, or the perception of coercion—such that 
the respondent would want to challenge them.  Purely voluntary requests, such as civil 
extradition mutual legal assistance treaty information requests from foreign countries or Hague 
Convention requests for evidence, implicate fewer of the concerns we identify later on, and also 
permit a brighter line by their exclusion.  We do recognize that at some point, a significant 
investment in non-coercive factfinding can morph into an investigation.  The line can be subtle 
and vary among and within agencies. 
Finally, our definition of investigative act excludes investigations by entities that are not 
“agencies.”  To make that determination, we look to the familiar APA definition of an “agency,” 
which carves out Congress, the courts, state and territorial governmental entities, and so forth.92  
Thus, this Article does not examine investigations by Article I actors or Article III courts.93  We 
also exclude certain entities from the APA definition that courts have construed as non-agencies, 
such as Presidential czars within the Executive Office of the President. 
 
89 Criminal investigations merit a separate investigation, but are typically associated with federal 
employees classified under the U.S. Office of Personnel Management’s Series GS-1811.  See 
OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MGMT., JOB FAMILY POSITION CLASSIFICATION STANDARD FOR 
ADMINISTRATIVE WORK IN THE JUSTICE AND NATIONAL SECURITY GROUP, 1800, at 12–14, 
https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/classification-qualifications/classifying-general-
schedule-positions/standards/1800/1800a.pdf (last visited Dec. 17, 2020).  Employees classified 
as 1811 investigators “supervise, lead, or perform work involving planning, conduct, or 
managing investigations related to alleged or suspected criminal violations of Federal laws.”  
U.S. OFFICE PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, HANDBOOK OF OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS AND FAMILIES 
109 (Dec. 2018), https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/classification-
qualifications/classifying-general-schedule-positions/occupationalhandbook.pdf. 
90 See generally Risa Berkower, Sliding Down A Slippery Slope? The Future Use of 
Administrative Subpoenas in Criminal Investigations, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2251 (2005). 
91 Cf., e.g., United States v. Bailey, 228 F.3d 341, 348 (4th Cir. 2000) (administrative subpoenas 
“commence[] an adversary process”). 
92 5 U.S.C. § 551(1). 
93 See, e.g., Matt Zapotosky, Judiciary Closes Investigation of Sexual Misconduct Allegations 
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In sum, an investigative act lies early on a spectrum of total agency behavior.  Agency 
activity progresses from a triggering event to an investigation, then to the beginning of an 
“agency action.”  If the action is adjudication, then the investigation ends with the allegation of a 
legal violation.  If the action is rulemaking, then the investigation ends with the commencement 
of a rulemaking process. 
III. AGENCY INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES AND METHODS 
Before understanding agency investigation norms and the appropriate legal response to 
agency investigations, it is necessary to understand precisely how agencies accomplish their 
investigations.  First, agencies often can issue subpoenas to inspect documents and other physical 
materials.94  Some agencies issue national security letters95 or “civil investigative demands”96 on 
responding parties.97  Other organic statutes endow agencies with the authority to conduct audits, 
by which the government gains documents or information.98 Congress has not given any agency 
the power to enforce such orders with contempt powers, although some state courts have 
permitted state agencies the power to punish disobedience with contempt.99 
Second, many agencies can inspect property or enter premises, sometimes for the purpose 
of inspecting records.100  The organic statute does not need to explicitly authorize searches, as 
courts will sometimes infer an agency’s ability to search.101 
 
94 See generally LAFAVE, 2 SEARCH & SEIZURE § 4.13 n.4 (5th ed.) (listing examples); see also, 
e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 449m (Department of Agriculture); 15 U.S.C. § 1311 (Department of Justice 
Antitrust Division); 18 U.S.C. § 923(g)(1)(B), (C) (Attorney General may inspect the records of 
certain licensed firearm importers, manufacturers, and dealers); 26 U.S.C. §§ 5123(a) (IRS), 
§ 7609 (IRS third-party summonses); 29 U.S.C. § 521(a) (Secretary of Labor); 49 U.S.C. 
§ 32910(a)(1)(A) (Secretary of Transportation and the Administrator of the Environmental 
Protection Agency); 52 U.S.C. § 20703 (Attorney General may inspect and copy certain records 
related to federal elections); Belle Fourche Pipeline Co. v. United States, 554 F. Supp. 1350, 
1359 (D. Wyo. 1983).  See also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, REPORT TO 
CONGRESS ON THE USE OF ADMINISTRATIVE SUBPOENA AUTHORITIES BY EXECUTIVE BRANCH 
AGENCIES AND ENTITIES apps. (2002), 
https://www.justice.gov/archive/olp/rpt_to_congress.htm#4. 
95 18 U.S.C. §§ 2709, 3511; see Doe v. Gonzales, 546 U.S. 1301 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., in 
chambers). 
96 Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Accrediting Council for Indep. Colls. & Schs., 854 F.3d 683, 
688 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
97 See also James E. Pfander & Daniel D. Birk, Article III Judicial Power, the Adverse-Party 
Requirement, and Non-Contentious Jurisdiction, 124 YALE L.J. 1346, 1379–80 (2015) (tracing a 
since-rejected view of Justice Field that agencies should conduct investigations without the aid 
of federal courts, and thus without the aid of the judiciary’s subpoena power). 
98 Cuéllar, supra note 79, at 252–5876–82. 
99 HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 19, § 8.2. 
100 E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2065(a) (Federal Trade Commission); 26 U.S.C. § 5123(b) (IRS); 30 U.S.C. 
§ 1267(a) (Department of the Interior); 42 U.S.C. § 7542(b)(2) (Environmental Protection 
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Third, agencies may make voluntary requests for interview or documents.102  Agencies 
can issue such requests against third parties, perhaps before the investigative learns that it is 
under investigation.  In doing so, agencies can liaise with state and local agencies.103  Of course, 
if these requests do not carry the perceived, eventual, or actual threat of compulsion for the party 
under investigation, then they lie outside our definition of investigative action.  
Finally, an agency may engage in noncoercive monitoring practices.  These include 
checking databases, public or private;104 maintaining interagency lines of communication;105 
setting up a tip line;106 conducting laboratory work, as with the Department of Commerce’s 
National Institute of Standards and Technology;107 and even reading the mail from the public 
such as an IRS Form 13909 Tax-Exempt Organization Complaint (Referral).  One source of 
information at an agency’s disposal is tips, inspector general findings, periodic reports from 
grantees, audits, charges, and complaints that it may receive at low to no cost.108  Passive 
practices require something more than merely watching the news or parsing the internet.109  Such 
monitoring practices, though facially non-coercive, can carry coercive tendencies if coupled with 
a subjectively-inferred threat of firmer action. 
Congress must authorize an agency, at least implicitly, to use these tools.  The APA 
contemplates agencies having such power and provides an agency with power to make “process, 
requirement of a report, inspection, or other investigative act or demand,” including a subpoena 
 
Agency); 49 U.S.C. § 60120(a)(2) (Secretary of Transportation may request the Attorney 
General bring a civil action to allow for on-site inspections to enforce 49 U.S.C. §§ 60101–
60141, regarding pipeline safety). 
101 E.g., Blackie’s House of Beef, Inc. v. Castillo, 659 F.2d 1211, 1221–22 (D.C. Cir. 1981); see 
Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 233 (1986). 
102 E.g., Kerry Flynn, Why the FBI Is Investigating Media Buying Practices, DIGIDAY (Oct. 15, 
2018), https://digiday.com/marketing/fbi-investigating-media-buying-practices/. 
103 E.g., 29 U.S.C. § 211(b) (Department of Labor may use the services of state and local labor 
agencies with consent); see also 27 U.S.C. § 202(f) (Department of Treasury may work with 
“any department or other agency of the Government” to enforce the Federal Alcohol 
Administration Act). 
104 Case Development and Limited Review Investigations, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Employee 
Benefits Sec. Admin., https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/about-ebsa/our-
activities/enforcement/oe-manual/case-development-and-limited-review-investigations (last 
visited Dec. 17, 2020). 
105 Id. 
106 E.g., HSI Tip Form, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, https://www.ice.gov/webform/hsi-
tip-form (last updated Aug. 23, 2018). 
107 15 U.S.C. §§ 271–281a; see Davis, supra note 13, at 1114. 
108 E.g., 7 U.S.C. § 193(a); 8 U.S.C. § 274a(b)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. 
109 See Davis, supra note 13, at 1114.  For more information on how agencies use internet 
evidence in their adjudications, see ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, 
INTERNET EVIDENCE IN AGENCY ADJUDICATION (2019), https://www.acus.gov/research-
projects/internet-evidence-agency-adjudication. 
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if “authorized by law.”110  However, the APA does not independently empower agencies to issue 
subpoenas or inspect property.111 
Rather, the primary source of an agency’s investigative authority is its organic statutes.  
The authority of an administrative agency to investigate is created solely by statute.112  By one 
count, “Congress has passed more than 300 administrative subpoena statutes grant[ing] some 
form of administrative subpoena authority to most federal agencies.”113   But creating some 
tension with that fundament, the Supreme Court held in Dow Chemical Co. v. United States that 
“[r]egulatory or enforcement authority generally carries with it all the modes of inquiry and 
investigation traditionally employed or useful to execute the authority granted.”114  Dow 
Chemical does not require an agency endowed with investigatory or enforcement authority “to 
identify explicitly each and every technique that may be used in the course of executing the 
statutory mission.”115  Courts have used this language—sometimes alongside an organic statute’s 
legislative history116—to permit certain modes of investigatory inspection or searches that are not 
specifically authorized by statute.117   
Expansive readings of this sort are sometimes necessary, as organic statutes often impose 
no textual constraints on the investigative techniques they may use.  For example, Congress has 
permitted the Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division Administrator to broadly 
“investigate such facts, conditions, practices, or matters as he may deem necessary or appropriate 
to determine whether any person has violated any provision of those chapter, or which may aid 
 
110 5 U.S.C. § 555(c), (d). 
111 ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 67 (1947) (“It 
should be emphasized that [this] relates only to an existing subpoena power conferred upon 
agencies; it does not grant power to issue subpoenas to agencies which are not so empowered by 
other statutes.”); United States v. Sec. State Bank & Trust, 473 F.2d 638, 642 (5th Cir. 1973). 
112 Peters v. United States, 853 F.2d 692, 696 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing 3 B. MEZINES, J. STEIN & J. 
GRUFF, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 20.02 (1988)); Univ. of Richmond v. Bell, 543 F. Supp. 321, 
332 (E.D. Va. 1982) (“[N]o inherent investigatory authority exists in a government agency but 
only such authority as is granted by statute.”); Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Accrediting 
Council for Indep. Colls. & Schs., 854 F.3d 683, 690 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“An administrative 
agency’s authority to issue subpoenas ‘is created solely by statute.’”). 
113 Robert A. Mikos, Can the States Keep Secrets from the Federal Government?, 161 U. PA. L. 
REV. 103, 117 (2012) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Subpoena 
Authority, STANFORD UNIV. & ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, 
https://acus.law.stanford.edu/reports/subpoena (last visited Dec. 17, 2020). 
114 Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 233 (1986). 
115 Id.. 
116 See, e.g., Boliden Metech, Inc. v. United States, 695 F. Supp. 77, 81 (D.R.I. 1988) (citing 
Toxic Substances Control Act, Conf. Rep. S. 3149, 94th Cong., 2d Session, reprinted in 1976 
U.S. Code Cong. and Admin. News 4491, 4572–73). 
117 Nat’l-Standard Co. v. Adamkus, 881 F.2d 352, 362 (7th Cir. 1989) (background sampling, 
although not specified in statute, was permissible under 42 U.S.C. § 6927(a)). 
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in the enforcement of the provisions of this chapter.”118  Similar expansive authority is held by 
the Office of Foreign Asset Control,119 the Drug Enforcement Administration,120 and the U.S. 
Postal Service.121  These textually broad delegations of investigatory authority provide little 
constraint to agencies’ exercise of discretion in utilizing investigatory tools. 
IV. CONSTRAINTS ON AGENCY INVESTIGATIONS 
There are several legal levers that check overzealous exercises of agency investigative 
authority with varying degrees of success.  They include tools under the U.S. Constitution, 
Administrative Procedure Act and other applicable statutes and regulations.  These legal levers 
tend to sort into a binary hard versus soft paradigm.  “Hard” checks are constraints on 
investigative acts that can be applied more directly by parties aggrieved by investigative acts, 
such as Fourth Amendment challenges to the relevancy of an agency investigative act.  “Soft” 
checks are constraints that include the articles of the U.S. Constitution embodying the doctrine of 
the separation of powers, congressional oversight, public pressure, executive or agency self-
constraint, and agency culture. 
A. Constitutional Constraints 
i. Constitutional Civil Liberties 
The Founders did not contemplate the modern administrative state and the complex civil 
society that it regulates.122  The administrative state, which has grown rapidly since the New 
Deal era, “has seemingly become an irresistible force” which “has collided with what at first 
were apparently immovable constitutional principles concerning privacy, searches and seizures, 
self-incrimination, and freedom from bureaucratic snooping.”123  In the wake of that era, courts 
have held repeatedly that the Constitution permits an agency to exercise investigative 
functions.124 
Nevertheless, the Constitution’s protections of civil liberties can serve to limit 
meandering agency investigations.  The primary guarantee of personal rights against improper 
investigations is the Fourth Amendment.  The Supreme Court has not interpreted these 
protections to be robust in the civil setting.  Generally, the agency’s power of access “is more 
analogous to the Grand Jury, which does not depend on a case or controversy for power to get 
 
118 29 U.S.C. §§ 211(a) (Fair Labor Standards Act), 2616(a) (for Family and Medical Leave, 
same). 
119 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)–(2). 
120 21 U.S.C. §§ 882(f), 880, 965; see 21 C.F.R. § 1316.03. 
121 39 U.S.C. § 404(a)(6); see 39 C.F.R. § 233.1. 
122 Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1233 
(1994). 
123 Davis, supra note 13. 
124 See, e.g., FTC v. Cinderella Career & Finishing Schs., Inc., 404 F.2d 1308, 1315 (D.C. Cir. 
1968) (collecting cases); In re McVane, 44 F.3d 1127, 1134 (2d Cir. 1995) (“Courts have 
imposed few constitutional limitations on agencies’ power to issue administrative subpoenas.”). 
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evidence, but can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated, or even just 
because it wants assurance that it is not.”125 
The Fourth Amendment interacts differently with certain types of agency investigatory 
tools.  Starting with subpoenas, an agency subpoena, including to appear at a deposition,126 
conducts a “constructive search.”127  The Fourth Amendment erects a number of hurdles on such 
subpoenas, albeit of varying heights.  In the modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudential 
landscape, as first annunciated in United States v. Morton Salt Co. and Oklahoma Press 
Publishing Co. v. Walling,128 a party may launch a “strictly limited” challenge to an agency’s 
subpoena in enforcement proceedings.129  The moving party must demonstrate that the agency 
has failed any of four showings that favor the agency.     
 
125 United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642–43 (1950). 
126 16 C.F.R. § 3.33 (FTC permits depositions); Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of 
Practice, 80 Fed. Reg. 60,091 (Oct. 5, 2015) (SEC proposing to allow depositions). 
127 Okla. Press Pub’g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 202 (1946); cf. McLane Co. v. EEOC, 137 S. 
Ct. 1159, 1169 (2017) (appearing to distance subpoena-quashing jurisprudence from the Fourth 
Amendment by stating that Oklahoma Press “implied that the Fourth Amendment is the source 
of the requirement that subpoena not be ‘too indefinite”). 
128 Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. at 652; Okla. Press Pub’g Co., 327 U.S. at 209; see also United 
States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 359 (1989) (in a more modern case, enforcing this requirement). 
129 FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d at 871–72; Univ. of Medicine & Dentistry of N.J. v. Corrigan, 
347 F.3d 57, 64 (3d Cir. 2003); accord Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Bay Shipbuilding 
Corp., 668 F.2d 304, 330–31 (7th Cir. 1981) (calling administrative subpoena enforcement 
proceedings “of a summary nature not requiring the issuance of process, hearing, findings of 
fact, and the elaborate process of a civil suit” (quoting Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Nat’l 
Labor Relations Bd., 122 F.2d 450, 451 (7th Cir. 1941))). 
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The following chart summarizes the dimensions of these standards that we discuss, 
below, follows: 
 
Fourth Amendment Showings Necessary to Challenge   
Pre-Adjudication Civil Investigatory Agency Subpoena 
Standard Requirements on Agency 
Is the subpoena in the 
agency’s authority? 
 must be within authority 
 cannot “plainly lack jurisdiction” 
 cannot investigate “other wrongdoing, as yet unknown” 
 must comply with all procedural requirements in its 
organic statute and with its own regulations 
 cannot be issued for improper purpose 
 cannot be issued in bad faith 
Is the subpoena “reasonably 
relevant”? 
 agency’s own appraisal of relevancy, which “must be 
accepted so long as it is not obviously wrong” 
 may hinge on whether the target of investigation is a 
person or a business association 
Is the subpoena overbroad or 
improper in scope? 
 cannot be “too indefinite” 
 cannot be “unreasonably broad” 
 must be “sufficiently limited in scope,” subject to federal 
privilege law 
Is the subpoena unduly 
burdensome? 
 cannot unduly burden the respondent 
 
First, an agency subpoena must be within the agency’s authority to issue.130  This 
requirement is variously articulated as whether the agency “plainly lacks” jurisdiction.131  That 
is, an agency cannot simply serve a subpoena seeking information to investigate “other 
wrongdoing, as yet unknown.”132  Relatedly, an agency must comply with all procedural 
requirements in its organic statute and with its own regulations,133 for example, if the statute 
requires the agency to state the nature of its investigation and the law supposedly being 
violated.134  An agency’s authority must extend not only to the type of investigatory tool used, 
but also to the type of information sought.  For example, an agency that holds the statutory 
 
130 United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964); Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. at 652; Okla. Press 
Pub’g Co., 327 U.S. at 209; see also United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 359 (1989) (in a more 
modern case, enforcing this requirement). 
131 NLRB v. Chapa de Indian Health Program, Inc., 316 F.3d 995 (9th Cir. 2003). 
132 In re Sealed Case (Admin. Subpoena), 42 F.3d 1412, 1419 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
133 See United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954). 
134 E.g., Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Accrediting Council for Indep. Colls. & Schs., 854 F.3d 
683, 690 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
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authority only to subpoena information to determine liability cannot enforce a subpoena of 
personal financial information for the purpose of assessing the individual’s net worth to 
determine the cost-effectiveness of an investigation.135  This standard is rather lax.  One circuit 
holds that “[a]s long as the agency’s assertion of authority is not apocryphal, a procedurally 
sound subpoena must be enforced.”136  The Supreme Court has confirmed that the assertion of 
authority is jurisdictional in nature, and that the familiar Chevron137 deference is due to an 
agency’s determination of its jurisdiction.138 
Relatedly, the subpoena cannot be used for an improper purpose or in bad faith.139  “Bad 
faith” must be institutionalized bad faith—bad faith by individual agency actors is insufficient.140  
An example of “bad faith” could include “harassment of the recipient of the subpoena, or a 
conscious attempt by the agency to pressure the recipient to settle a collateral dispute.”141  
However, it is worth noting that the “purpose” of the subpoena in the seminal case establishing 
this requirement, United States v. Powell, was important because the agency at issue, the IRS, 
could issue summons for only limited purposes.142  Thus, the “improper purpose” requirement 
might not be available to parties challenging every type of investigative act under every type of 
organic statute.   
 
135 Resolution Tr. Corp. v. Walde, 18 F.3d 943, 947–49 (D.C. Cir. 1994); see Katherine Scherb, 
Administrative Subpoenas for Private Financial Records: What Protection for Privacy Does the 
Fourth Amendment Afford?, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 1075, 1085–97 (summarizing case law).  Note 
that the D.C. Circuit does not view this ultra vires inquiry as being constitutional.  Id. at 949. 
136 United States v. Sturm, Roger & Co., 84 F.3d 1, 5–6 (1st Cir. 1996). 
137 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
138 City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290 (2013).  ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, supra note 111, at 69 (citing Endicott Johnson Corp. v. 
Perkins, 317 U.S. 501 (1943); Okla. Press Pub’g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 1 86 (1946); “Nothing 
the language of section 6(c) suggests any purpose to change this established rule.”).  The 
Attorney General’s Manual cited the fact that an earlier APA bill specifically entitled courts to 
“determine all relevant questions of law raised by the parties, including the authority or 
jurisdiction of the agency.”  Id.  However, that language did not make it into the enacted bill.  Id.  
Note that the Constitution, if not the APA, allows courts to hear certain challenges to an agency’s 
jurisdiction, per post-1946 case law from the Supreme Court. 
139 United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 58 (1964); Resolution Tr. Corp. v. Frates, 61 F.3d 962, 
965 (D.C. Cir. 1995); see Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Accrediting Council for Indep. Colls. & 
Schs., 854 F.3d 683, 689 (D.C. Cir. 2017).  
140 United States v. LaSalle Nat’l Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 317–18 (1978); SEC v. Wheeling-
Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 648 F.2d 118, 125 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc); United States v. Markwood, 
48 F.3d 969, 978 (6th Cir. 1995).  
141 United States v. Markwood, 48 F.3d 969, 978 (6th Cir. 1995).  
142 Powell, 379 U.S. at 49–51, 57–58. 
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Second, the subpoena must be “reasonably relevant.”143  This standard appears lax, too.  
Because the “standard for judging relevancy in an investigatory proceeding is more relaxed than 
in an adjudicatory one,”144 the court “defer[s] to the agency’s appraisal of relevancy, which 
‘must be accepted so long as it is not obviously wrong.’”145  The burden of showing irrelevance 
lies with the responding party.146 
The relevance test may hinge on whether the target of investigation is a person or a 
business association.  This distinction derives from the penumbraic right to privacy recognized 
from, inter alia, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and from a statement in Morton Salt that 
corporations “can claim no equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a right to privacy.”147  
This test is consistent with the APA’s House Judiciary Committee Report, which opined that an 
agency “investigation must be substantially and demonstrably necessary to agency 
operations.”148  The effect of this distinction may be a lower bar for the responding party to show 
irrelevance,149 especially if the responding party is a third party who is not the target of the 
agency’s investigation.150 
Third, the subpoena must not be “too indefinite”151 or “unreasonably broad,”152  and it 
must be “sufficiently limited in scope.”153  Federal privilege law governs the subpoena’s 
scope.154 
 
143 Powell, 379 U.S. 48; United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950); Okla. Press 
Pub’g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 209 (1946); see also United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 
359 (1989) (in a more modern case, enforcing this requirement). 
144 Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Invention Submission Corp., 965 F.2d 1089, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
145 Resolution Tr. Corp. v. Walde, 18 F.3d 943, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
146 Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Invention Submission Corp., 965 F.2d at 1090. 
147 338 U.S. at 652. 
148 H. Rep. 1980 at 264 (May 3, 1946). 
149 In re McVane, 44 F.3d 1127, 1137 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Harrington, 388 F.2d 520, 
524 (2d Cir. 1968); cf. Doe v. United States, 253 F.3d 256, 270 (6th Cir. 2002); FDIC v. Garner, 
126 F.3d 1138, 1143–44 (9th Cir. 1997). 
150 In re McVane, 44 F.3d at 1137–38. 
151 United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964); Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. at 652; Okla. Press 
Pub’g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 209 (1946); see also United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 
359 (1989) (in a more modern case, enforcing this requirement). 
152 See, e.g., FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d at 881–82; N.L.R.B. v. Am. Med. Response, Inc., 
438 F.3d 188, 192 (2d Cir. 2006). 
153 See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 544 (1967). 
154 See, e.g., Linde Thomson Langworthy Kohn & Van Dyke, P.C. v. Resolution Tr. Corp., 5 
F.3d 1508, 1513 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (citing FTC v. TRW, Inc., 628 F.2d 207, 210–11 (D.C. Cir. 
1980) (FTC); Dole v. Milonas, 889 F.2d 885, 889 n.6 (9th Cir. 1989) (ERISA); United States v. 
Schoenheinz, 548 F.2d 1389, 1390 (9th Cir. 1977) (IRS); Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 
636 (2d Cir. 1962) (IRS)). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3757677




Fourth, the subpoena cannot be “unduly burdensome.”155  Once challenged, the burden is 
on the agency to show that the subpoena does not impose undue burdens.156  There are very few 
cases in which a court has quashed a subpoena on this basis.157   
These showings are not needed until the subpoena is challenged in court; a judicial 
warrant is not a condition precedent to a valid administrative subpoena.158  To serve a subpoena 
in the first place, an agency does not need probable cause159 or reasonable suspicion.160  The 
agency need only be “reasonable,” which means compliance with the above criteria.161 Nor must 
the agency “make a preliminary finding of liability before it can even initiate an 
investigation.”162  One possible exception is that in the D.C. Circuit at least, an agency must 
demonstrate an “articulable suspicion” of liability to enforce a subpoena for personal financial 
information.163  The fact that probable cause in the criminal sense is not required provides 
another incentive for agency investigators to start building their case with civil investigative 
tools over criminal investigative tools. 
Judicial review of agency subpoenas to determine compliance with the above criteria is 
“strictly limited” on account of “the important governmental interest in the expeditious 
investigation of possible unlawful activity.”164  Courts “generally defer to an agency’s 
interpretation of the scope of its own investigation.”165  During the proceedings to quash, a court 
 
155 See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 544 (1967); FCC v. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d 862, 882 & 
n.51 (D.C. Cir. 1977); FTC v. Church & Dwight Co., 665 F.3d 1312, 1316 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
156 EEOC v. Md. Cup Corp., 785 F.2d 471, 476 (4th Cir. 1986); EEOC v. Children’s Hosp. Med. 
Ctr., 719 F.2d 1426, 1428 (9th Cir. 1983) (en banc).  Cf.  FTC v. Jim Walter Corp. 651 F.2d 251, 
258 (5th Cir. 1981) (putting the burden on the affected party to show that compliance would 
impose an unreasonable burden), abrogated on other grounds by Republic of Panama v. BCCI 
Holdings (Lux.) S.A., 119 F.3d 935 (11th Cir. 1997). 
157 EEOC v. Aon Consulting, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 2d 601, 603 (S.D. Ind. 2001) (subpoena unduly 
burdensome, but conditioning enforcement on agency’s willingness to enter a confidentially 
agreement). 
158 Donovan v. Lone Steer, Inc., 464 U.S. 408, 415 (1984). 
159 Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320–21 (1978); accord Camara v. Municipal Court 
of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967); Okla. Press Pub’g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 209 (1946). 
160 DeMasters v. Arend, 313 F.2d 88 (1963); United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 
642–43 (1950). 
161 United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 51 (1964). 
162 In re Sealed Case (Admin. Subpoena), 42 F.3d 1412, 1416 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (citing FTC v. 
Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d 862, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1977)). 
163 Resolution Tr. Corp. v. Walde, 18 F.3d 943, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1994).  The “articulable 
suspicion” requirement also applies to determining an individual’s ability to pay a civil penalty.  
In re Sealed Case (Admin. Subpoena), 42 F.3d 1412, 1417 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
164 U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n v. ASAT, Inc., 411 F.3d 245, 253 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (quoting FTC v. 
Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d at 872). 
165 Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Accrediting Council for Indep. Colls. & Schs., 854 F.3d 683, 
689 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (citing FTC v. Church & Dwight Co., 665 F.3d 1312, 1315–16 (D.C. Cir. 
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will not hear substantive defenses that the investigated party may have to the underlying 
investigation during its pendency.166  Arguments that the respondent is not within the agency’s 
jurisdiction may typically only be made in defense of an administratively exhausted final 
enforcement action.167  Another nigh insurmountable challenge is that an investigated party 
might not know that an administrative subpoena went out to a third party, or might not have 
standing to challenge the demand.168 
If the movant succeeds in enforcement proceedings, the remedy is unclear.  Courts 
sometimes imply that the agency need only reissue the problematic subpoena within certain 
parameters169 and sometimes suggest they are executable as modified by the court.170  Regardless 
of the procedure the agency must undertake going forward, it is not difficult or burdensome for 
the agency to quickly demand from a party the maximum amount of information that it is 
allowed.  Even when the subpoena is quashed, the remedy is often “limited to a judicial 
requirement that the agency narrow the scope of the subpoena or identify the materials sought 
with greater specificity.”171   
Yet courts will, rarely, vindicate the right not to be investigated beyond statutory 
authority once the investigation and then final agency action has concluded.  One circuit court 
held that the agency’s “comprehensive initial investigation . . . pursuant to the Secretary’s 
standard practice exceeded his statutory authority from the outset.”172  In fashioning a remedy, 
that court simply struck the administrative findings of violations and awards against the 
investigated party.173 
The following chart summarizes the domain of administrative subpoenas before and after 
the Supreme Court’s decisions in Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. and Morton Salt Co.  The 
chart compares these standards with the standards for grand jury subpoenas, another type of 
 
2011); Dir., Office of Thrift Supervision v. Vinson & Elkins, LLP, 124 F.3d 1304, 1307 (D.C. 
Cir. 1997)). 
166 FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d at 879. 
167 McLane Co. v. EEOC, 137 S. Ct. 1159, 1165 (2017); CSG Workforce Partners, LLC v. 
Watson, 512 F. App’x 830, 836 (10th Cir. 2013); Donovan v. Shaw, 668 F.2d 985, 989 (8th Cir. 
1982); FTC v. Ken Roberts Co., 276 F.3d 538, 584 (D.C. Cir. 2001); FMC v. Port of Seattle, 521 
F.2d 431 (9th Cir. 1975); SEC v. Savage, 513 F.2d 188 (7th Cir. 1975). 
168 Berkower, supra note 90, at 2275–76. 
169 Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. TriCore Reference Labs., 849 F.3d 929, 943 
(10th Cir. 2017) (“Our decision [quashing the EEOC’s subpoena] should not preclude the EEOC 
from formulating a request for information to overcome the concerns discussed in this 
opinion.”); see In re McVane, 44 F.3d 1127, 1137 (2d Cir. 1995) (implying same).  
170 EEOC v. Aon Consulting, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 2d 601, 603 (S.D. Ind. 2001) (permitting 
enforcement as modified by the court); EEOC v. United Air Lines, Inc., 287 F.3d 643, 653 (7th 
Cir. 2002) (implying such). 
171 HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 19, § 8.2 (citing United States v. Theodore, 479 F.2d 749 (4th 
Cir. 1973)); cf. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 601 F.2d 162, 166 (5th Cir. 1979) (grand jury). 
172 Greater Mo. Med. Pro Care Providers, Inc. v. Perez, 812 F.3d 1132, 1139 (8th Cir. 2015). 
173 Id. 
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investigative subpoena, albeit one used for a criminal investigative purpose. 
 
 
174 Harriman v. ICC, 211 U.S. 407 (1908); FTC v. Am. Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298 (1924); 
Brown v. United States, 276 U.S. 134 (1928); Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1 (1936). 
175 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974). 
176 U.S. v. R. Enterprises, Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 301 (1991). 
177 Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362 (1956). 
178 FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c)(2). 
179 Id. 
180 United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 299 (1991). 
Comparison of Procedural Protections for Administrative Subpoenas Before and After Oklahoma Press 
Publishing Co. (1946) and Morton Salt Co. (1950), with Grand Jury Subpoenas 




Grand Jury Subpoena 
Pre-issuance role of 
Article III judge? 
No No Yes; convened under 
auspices of judge 






Discretionary; “as it 
considers 
appropriate”175 
Relevance? Limited to cases 
“where the 
investigations concern 
a specific breach of the 
law” 
Must be “reasonably 
relevant” 
Must be a reasonable 
possibility that category 
of materials 
Government seeks will 
produce information 
relevant to general 
subject of 
investigation176 
Breadth? No roving “fishing 
expeditions;” must 
specify a reasonable 
period of time and 
reasonably particular 
subjects 
Cannot be “too 
indefinite” 
Limited by function 
toward the possible 




Yes Yes No; reasonableness and 
oppressiveness 
standard178 
Bad faith basis 
acceptable? 
Not explicitly No No 
Timing of challenge Apparently post-
issuance 
While a subpoena may 
be challenged before 
final agency action, the 
investigation itself 
otherwise may typically 
only be made after final 
action; no meaningful 
judicial pre-
determination. 
Post-issuance as to the 
subpoena,179 however, 
grand juries cannot 
“engage in arbitrary 
fishing expeditions, nor 
may they select targets 
of investigation out of 
malice or an intent to 
harass.”180 
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We shift to administrative search warrants, which are less difficult to challenge than an 
administrative subpoena.  A warrant is generally required before an agency may conduct a 
“search” within the Fourth Amendment.181  The Supreme Court has recognized exceptions for a 
motley assortment of certain regulated industries: those involving liquor,182 firearms,183 
mining,184 or junkyards185—but not hotel operation186 or commercial activity generally.187 
To validly execute an administrative warrant, an agency must provide a court with 
discrete evidence of an existing violation,188 or a “reasonable belief” or “reasonable 
suspicion.”189  The search must be part of a general neutral administrative plan.190   An agency 
may not conduct an investigation outside the scope of its authority, although probable cause in 
the criminal sense is not required.191   
We reiterate that the landscape is different in the criminal context (although that lies 
beyond the scope of this Article).  Also, “evidence implicating diminished privacy interests or 
for a corporation’s own books” might not be protected by the Fourth Amendment.192   
Another amendment of the Bill of Rights that protects subjects of agency investigations is 
the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause.  Regarding revealing document contents, this 
Clause protects the respondent only from compelled self-incrimination.193  This hinges on how 
the documents were originally prepared; if the responding party prepared business records 
voluntarily, even if before the investigation, then the compulsion is constitutional.194  
Under the same reasoning, regarding the act of document production, the Self-
Incrimination Clause may be invoked only when the subpoena or warrant “compels the holder of 
the document to perform an act that may have testimonial aspects and an incriminating effect.”195  
Those aspects may be present, for example, if “[c]ompliance with the subpoena tacitly concedes 
 
181 Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 325 & n.23 (1978). 
182 Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970). 
183 United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972). 
184 Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981). 
185 New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987). 
186 City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409, 424–25 (2015). 
187 See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967). 
188 Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320–21 (1978). 
189 Matter of Midwest Instruments Co., 900 F.2d 1150, 1153 (7th Cir. 1990). 
190 Marshall, 436 U.S. at 320–21. 
191 Id. at 320 
192 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2221 & n.5 (2018) (citing cases including Untied 
States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 634, 651–53 (1950); Okla. Press Pub’g Co. v. Walling, 
327 U.S. 186, 189, 204–08 (1946)). 
193 United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 610 (1984). 
194 Id. 
195 Id. at 612–13. 
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the existence of the papers demanded.”196  But where a respondent is required to comply with a 
regulatory regime unrelated to criminal law enforcement—as is often the case with regulated 
industries—there is no Self-Incrimination Clause privilege available.197 
Moreover, the Self-Incrimination Clause is inapplicable with regard to third-party 
subpoenas.198  The Self-Incrimination Clause may, however, be invoked in an agency 
investigation to protect against a disclosure that the respondent reasonably believes could be 
used against it in a criminal proceeding or could lead to other such evidence.199 
The Supreme Court interprets the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause to provide 
even less protection against improper agency investigations.200  Writing for the Court in 1960, 
Chief Justice Warren acknowledged that due process “is an elusive concept,” but that “when 
governmental action does not partake of an adjudication, as for example, when a general fact-
finding investigation is being conducted, it is not necessary that the full panoply of judicial 
procedures be used.”201  The Due Process Clause tolerates an agency using its subpoena power to 
gather evidence adverse to a person under investigation without notifying him or her, as “an 
administrative investigation adjudicates no legal rights.”202  Similarly, the right of cross-
examination generally does not apply in agency investigations.203   
The Due Process Clause will also permit an agency working on an initially civil 
investigation that results only in a criminal prosecution.204  As the Supreme Court has held, 
“[t]he discovery of evidence of crimes in the course of an otherwise proper administrative 
 
196 Id. at 613 (quoting United States v. Fisher, 425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976)); United States v. 
Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 43–45 (2000); see also In re Twelve Grand Jury Subpoenas, 908 F.3d 525, 
528 (9th Cir. 2018). 
197 Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1948) (introducing the required records doctrine 
that is an exception to the Fifth Amendment); Balt. City Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Bouknight, 493 
U.S. 549, 555–60 (1990). 
198 U.S. CONST. amend. V; SEC v. Jerry T. O’Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 742 (1984) (“The 
rationale of this doctrine is that the Constitution proscribes only compelled self-incrimination, 
and, whatever may be the pressures exerted upon the person to whom a subpoena is directed, the 
subpoena surely does not ‘compel’ anyone else to be a witness against himself.”) (internal 
citations omitted). 
199 Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444–45 (1972). 
200 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
201 Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960). 
202 Jerry T. O’Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. at 742 (internal citations omitted). 
203 Hannah, 363 U.S. at 445–46. 
204 Doe v. United States, 253 F.3d 256, 265 (6th Cir. 2001) (“Both the Supreme Court and this 
circuit have long applied [the reasonableness] test when reviewing administrative subpoena 
requests, and we see no convincing basis upon which to distinguish these binding precedents 
simply because this subpoena was issued pursuant to a criminal, as oppose to civil, 
investigation.”); Becker v. Kroll, 494 F.3d 904, 917 (10th Cir. 2007) (noting that the 
administrative subpoena was enforceable, even though it had “potential criminal ramifications,” 
because it was “issued in good faith and prior to a recommendation for criminal prosecution”). 
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inspection does not render that search illegal or the administrative scheme suspect.”205  There is 
thus a very low barrier to a law enforcement agency referring a matter to an administrative 
agency.  Parallel investigations do not violate civil liberties so long as the agency is not 
investigating solely to obtain evidence for a criminal prosecution, and did not fail to advise the 
defendant that a criminal prosecution has been contemplated, and there are no “other special 
circumstances.”206  Stated differently, courts have approved administrative proceedings that 
result from a criminal referral, so long as the criminal investigation did not interfere with the 
agency’s operations, and the parallel proceedings are conducted in “good faith.”207  The reason: 
to hold otherwise, if “investigators suspected that a particular store might contain evidence of 
other crimes, the investigators would be precluded from performing any administrative 
inspection of that store.”208  This nevertheless leaves open an obvious potential for abuse.209 
There are some boundaries in place to prevent agency officials who cannot meet the 
higher standard from doing this with the hope or intent of transitioning to criminal liability.  An 
agency cannot conduct an investigation when its true purpose is a criminal investigation,210 that 
is, an investigation that is not “for a purely administrative purpose,” but rather one that “carries 
the real threat of criminal sanctions.”211  Courts have been mollified by the fact that “while 
information obtained by an administrative subpoena could be shared with prosecutors and used 
in a criminal investigation, grand jury secrecy would prevent information from moving in the 
other direction.”212  That said, other courts have suggested that an administrative warrant may be 
taken when the agency’s aim is not solely to build a criminal case.213  Because the Supreme 
Court—as with most facets of investigative acts—has not addressed this question in decades, a 
contemporary challenge that raises these issues could result in a different outcome.   
As the preceding discussion illustrates, there are many limitations in using the U.S. 
Constitution to deter an agency from using an improper investigatory tool or to challenge the use 
of such a tool.  Even if a regulated entity could try to make out a Bivens214 claim on the above, 
damages are the only remedy though they are based on a predicate finding of unconstitutional 
conduct.  It would not seem that a court could halt an investigation., but at least one court has 
commented that it was unaware of case law permitting a Bivens remedy in the context of an 
agency investigation.215 
 
205 New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 716 (1987). 
206 United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1970). 
207 Shiv Narayan Persaud, Parallel Investigations Between Administrative and Law Enforcement 
Agencies: A Question of Civil Liberties, 39 U. DAYTON L. REV. 77, 89–90 (2013). 
208 United States v. Mansour, 252 F. Supp. 3d 182, 202 (W.D.N.Y. 2017). 
209 Persaud, supra note 207, at 95–99 (citing possible examples). 
210 Id. at 716 n.27. 
211 Jacob v. Twp. of Bloomfield, 531 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 2008); United States v. Theodore, 479 
F.2d 749, 753 (4th Cir. 1973). 
212 Berkower, supra note 90, at 2264; see FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e). 
213 See, e.g., United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1970). 
214 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
215 Casella v. United States, 642 F. App’x 54, 56 (2d Cir. 2016). 
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Putting aside whether a position is likely to succeed in the long run, the case law 
generally does not permit a respondent to raise any merits defenses in challenging an agency 
action.  Finally, there is a lack of post-enforcement accountability.  A motion to quash an 
administrative warrant may be moot where the warrant has been fully executed prior to the 
appeal.216  The respondent would have to argue, for example, that the issue is evading review yet 
capable of repetition.  Unless the party is frequently investigated by the same agency, this 
showing may be difficult. 
ii. Constitutional Separation of Powers 
The Constitution can constrain overzealous agency investigations through not just the 
Bill of Rights, but also its structure-of-government provisions.  As Professor Nicholas Bagley 
has written, “Congress and the president both remain on the scene, fully capable of reforming or 
restraining agencies.”217  Through Article I, Congress may exercise control over certain agency 
investigations—beyond, of course, legislating directly on the matter.218 
Article I is the font from which the Supreme Court infers the Non-Delegation Doctrine.219  
Some scholars hold the view that the administrative agencies have become microcosms of 
government unto themselves, with Article III judicial review constrained by the APA to final 
agency action.220  If challengers can reinvigorate the long-dormant non-delegation doctrine, then 
they may be able to challenge agency investigatory methods on the basis that Congress did not 
intend to delegate such broad authority to the agency—depending, of course, on the exact 
agency, organic statute, and investigatory method used.221    
Another way Congress can restrain agency investigative acts is through its oversight 
power.222  Naturally, members of Congress disagree over how they want the government and its 
agencies to run.223  Nevertheless, “[l]egislators tend to prioritize the investigation and monitoring 
of executive bureaucracies,” because it helps them achieve policy goals and “lets them claim 
 
216 Koppers Indus., Inc. v. EPA, 902 F.2d 756, 758 (9th Cir. 1990) (CERCLA warrant). 
217 Nicholas Bagley, The Procedure Fetish, 118 MICH. L. REV. 345, 351 (2019). 
218 See, e.g., SEC v. Jerry T. O’Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 745–46 (1984). 
219 See, e.g., HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 19, § 8.1 (citing FTC v. Balt. Grain Co., 284 F. 886, 
888, 890 (D. Md. 1922) (overbroad delegation would be “beyond any power which Congress can 
confer”), aff’d, 267 U.S. 586 (1924)); Ronald A. Cass, Delegation Reconsidered: A Delegation 
Doctrine for the Modern Administrative State, 40 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 147, 178 (2017); 
Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 335–53 (2002). 
220 Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231 (1994). 
221 See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2131 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“The 
Constitution promises that only the people’s elected representatives may adopt new federal laws 
restricting liberty.”); see id. at 2130–31 (Alito, J., concurring); Paul v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 
342, 342 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., respecting the denial of certiorari). 
222 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; see Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957); J.R. DeShazo 
& Jody Freeman, The Congressional Competition to Control Delegated Power, 81 TEX. L. REV. 
1443, 1459–66 (2003) 
223 Cuéllar, supra note 79, at 274–75. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3757677




credit for making the government work more efficiently and effectively.”224  Oversight can be 
“police patrol oversight”—more routinized oversight characterized by constant vigilance of what 
an agency is doing—versus “fire alarm oversight”, in which Congress waits for interest groups, 
the public, the media, or inspectors general to draw Congress’s attention to an agency 
problem.225  
Oversight may occur formally, by committees holding oversight hearings.  For example, 
the House held a hearing on the Federal Trade Commission’s investigation authority: “The 
Federal Trade Commission and Its Section 5 Authority: Prosecutor, Judge, and Jury.”226  
Oversight can proceed less formally than committee and subcommittee hearings.  Congressional 
staff can examine agency investigative practices by asking questions of the agency directly and 
requesting documents.227  Members can directly contact the White House for help influencing 
how an agency investigates.228  Congress can use its appropriations power to fund or defund the 
agency as a whole or parts of the agency to control how the agency conducts investigations.229  
Scholars have questioned whether congressional oversight is actually effective.230  Conversely, 
agencies may internalize congressional oversight signaling as a mechanism to mitigate the 
adverse attention that flows from acting in defiance to congressional concerns.231 
Congress may also, of course, enact statutes channeling or directing agency investigation 
processes.  Reporting statutes are one example.  The Government Performance and Results Act 
of 1993232 requires federal agencies to develop long-term strategic plans to clarify their missions, 
develop short-term performance plans to identify performance measures for outputs and 
outcomes, and report to Congress how they performed against those goals.233 
Another Article I check on agency investigations is the strategic use of the Senate’s 
confirmation powers.  Officers of the United States must be appointed in accordance with Article 
 
224 Id. at 296–97. 
225 Id. at 297 (citing Mathew McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight 
Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 166–68 (1984)). 
226 See Opening Statement, Rep. Elijah E. Cummings, Ranking Member, House Committee on 
Oversight and Government Reform (July 24, 2014), 
https://oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/migrated/uploads/EEC.Ope
ningStatement.072414.pdf. 
227 Cuéllar, supra note 79, at 297 (citing JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY 235–44 (1989)). 
228 Id. 
229 Id.; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. 
230 See, e.g., Philip J. Weiser, Entrepreneurial Administration, 97 B.U. L. REV. 2011, 2081 
(2017). 
231 Id. at 2045; Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2123 (2019). 
232 Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat. 283 (codified in scattered sections of titles 5, 31, and 39 of the 
U.S. Code). 
233 Matthew S. Schoen, Good Enough for Government Work?: The Government Performance 
Results Act of 1993 and Its Impact on Federal Agencies, 32 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 455, 456–57 
(2008). 
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II.234  The Constitution thus permits Congress to freeze the consideration of nominees or reject 
them outright in response to agency investigations or information sharing—even indirect to the 
nominee or the nomination itself—that proceed contrary to Congress’s wishes.235 
B. Statutory Constraints 
i. Administrative Procedure Act 
The Constitution provides the minimum procedural and substantive rights against agency 
investigative acts.  With the APA’s prescriptive positive procedures for agency adjudication and 
rulemaking and its waiver of sovereign immunity to facilitate judicial review, one might assume 
that the statute similarly confers positive procedures for agency investigations and procedural 
protections to individuals who are the subject of investigative acts.  As demonstrated in the chart 
and analysis below, the APA imposed no meaningful constraints on administrative investigation. 
 
Administrative Procedure Act Explicit Treatment of Agency 
Investigative Acts 
APA Section Effect 
5 U.S.C. § 555(c) Standard for administrative subpoenas: 
must be enforced “as provided for by 
law” 
5 U.S.C. § 555(d) Procedural basis to challenge 
administrative subpoenas and “similar 
process or demand” 
5 U.S.C. § 554(d) Miscellaneous provisions, including the 
limited constraints on administrative 
law judges reporting to agency 
investigators 
 
The drafting history of the APA evinces little consideration of investigative acts.236  The 
Supreme Court held that APA procedures available for adjudications and rulemakings do not 
 
234 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
235 See, e.g., Burgess Everett & Marianne Levine, The Senate’s Record-Breaking Gridlock under 
Trump, POLITICO (June 8, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/06/08/senate-record-
breaking-gridlocktrump-303811?nname=playbook&nid=0000014f-1646-d88f-a1cf-
5f46b7bd0000&nrid=00000167-e00b-dea6-a1ff-eabfdb380000&nlid=630318. 
236 ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, supra note 111, 
at 66–69, 131–32.  The Supreme Court has deferred to the Attorney General’s Manual on the 
APA to the extent it does not conflict with the APA.  See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 
U.S. 281, 302 n.31 (1979). 
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apply to agency investigations.237  Indeed, one of the few APA provisions concerning 
investigative acts arise in a section entitled “Ancillary matters.”238   
The APA contains investigation-specific provisions, although they have not been 
vigorously invoked by litigants or applied by courts.239  In 5 U.S.C. § 554(d), the APA 
acknowledges agency civil investigations by stating that an employee who participated in the 
investigation may not make a formal adjudication of the resulting matter.240  Under Section 
§ 555(d), affected parties and agencies may go to court to contest or enforce, respectively, 
“subp[o]ena[s] or similar process or demand.”241  These provisions were intended to leave 
unchanged the existing (i.e., pre-1946) law on judicial review of subpoenas.242 
This part of the APA is unclear and rarely litigated—especially so in the past few 
decades.243  When an affected party challenges a subpoena or similar process, the few courts to 
consider this provision have held that the agency bears the burden to show that the subpoena is 
for a lawful purpose.244 
The APA includes a substantive standard for a litigant to reference when invoking the 
cause of action available under § 555(d).  Under 5 U.S.C. § 555(c), any investigative act—
including subpoenas, process, inspection, and so forth—must be made and enforced “as 
authorized by law.”245  This provision appears separate from the familiar APA cause of action in 
5 U.S.C. § 706(2), which provides for the setting aside of final agency action that is contrary to 
law or is “arbitrary or capricious.”  As with the procedural § 555(d), litigants rarely invoke 
 
237 Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 452–53 (1960). 
238 5 U.S.C. § 555. 
239 We note that our definition of an “investigative act” excludes an agency proceeding governed 
by positive APA procedures.  We do not consider these Sections 555(c) and (d) to be such 
procedures.  Otherwise, because those sections do relate to investigative acts, counting them as 
positive APA procedures would have the exclusion swallow the rule and exclude everything we 
have yet deemed to be an agency investigation. 
240 5 U.S.C. § 554(d). 
241 Id. § 555(d).   
242 ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, supra note 111, 
at 68–69, 131–32. 
243 As of July 6, 2020, Westlaw recorded only 1,266 case citations to the entirety of 5 U.S.C. 
§ 555.  The database shows that of those, there are only 37 cases that use the term “555(c)” or 
“6(b)” (which is the section of the APA codified at 5 U.S.C. § 555(c)).  Westlaw also shows that 
of those 1,266 cases, there are only 39 cases that use the term “555(d)” or “6(c)” (which is the 
section of the APA codified at 5 U.S.C. § 555(d)).  These meager figures are overinclusive, as 
some of these cases cite to provisions within sections 555(c) and (d) that do not relate to 
investigative acts, or cite to completely distinct uses of those sections. 
244 United States v. Sec. State Bank & Trust, 473 F.2d 638, 642 (5th Cir. 1973) (citing “the 
acceptable practice under analogous administrative schemes”). 
245 5 U.S.C. § 555(c). 
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§ 555(c) to challenge agency investigations.  Both have been used sparingly.246  This may be 
consistent with the APA drafters’ expectation that this standard was a mere “restatement of 
existing law.”247  Interestingly, the House Judiciary Committee Report broadly declared that the 
provision codified at § 555(c) was “designed to preclude ‘fishing expedition’ and investigations 
beyond the jurisdiction or authority of an agency.”248  However, the enacted provision—barring 
investigative process “except as authorized by law”—is textually weaker than the Committee 
Report’s remark suggests. 
Nevertheless, § 555(c) may be significant because it is not coextensive with § 706(2), a 
distinct solution for challenging investigative behavior.  Section 706(2) is subject to the 
requirement that the challenged agency conduct be “final,”249 whereas the provision for judicial 
review of agency investigative tools appears to be unencumbered by that qualification.250  
Another constraint applicable to adjudication and rulemaking, § 553, does not to apply to 
§ 555(d) actions because an investigation does not appear to be an adjudication or rulemaking 
under the APA’s definition of those terms.251 
There are several arguments to be made for applying these APA provisions to more 
robustly police investigative acts.  The APA House Judiciary Committee Report went further 
than what the sparse § 555(c) and (d) case law holds.  The Committee claimed that by restricting 
investigative acts to those “authorized by law,” the APA authorized quashing investigative acts 
that “disturb or disrupt personal privacy, or unreasonably interfere with private occupation or 
enterprise.”252  The Report also warned agencies that their investigations “should be conducted 
so as to interfere in the least degree compatible with adequate law enforcement.”253 
However, the enacted bill does not textually incorporate these principles, and these 
guideposts were not repeated in the influential Attorney General’s Manual.254  They have been 
 
246 See, e.g., Sch. Bd. of Broward Cnty. v. Dep’t of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 525 F.2d 900, 906 
n.6 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 646 (1950) (implying a 
§ 555(c) violation is judicially enforceable); J.H. Kent v. Hardin, 425 F.2d 1346, 1350 (5th Cir. 
1970) (same); In re FTC Corp. Patterns Report Litig., No. 76-0126, 1977 WL 1438, at *2 
(D.D.C. July 11, 1977) (same). 
247 ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, supra note 111, 
at 66; see also ASIMOW, supra note 8, at 47 (“The provision seems to add nothing to existing 
law.”).   
248 H. Rep. 1980 at 264 (May 3, 1946).  One court has held that the APA does not prohibit 
“fishing expeditions” in and of themselves, but rather ultra vires “fishing expeditions.”  Pac. 
Westbound Conference v. United States, 332 F.2d 49, 53 (9th Cir. 1964). 
249 5 U.S.C. § 704. 
250 See id. § 555(c), (d) (not referring to judicial review “agency action,” which § 704 generally 
requires to be final). 
251 Id. § 551; Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 452–53 (1960). 
252 H. Rep. 1980 at 264 (May 3, 1946). 
253 Id. 
254 ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, supra note 111, 
at 66. 
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cited precisely once by a federal court—in 1964.255  Further, under pre-APA case law that the 
Attorney General’s Manual concluded was left intact by the APA, until final agency action 
occurs to a respondent’s detriment, a court cannot determine whether the respondent is actually 
subject to the law the agency is purporting to enforce.256  Also, the § 555(d) standard, that an 
agency investigation is “authorized by law,” is per one court merely coextensive with the 
§ 706(2)(A) “arbitrary or capricious” standard.257 
There is also uncertainly as to what “law” an agency subpoena or warrant could be 
quashed for violating.  The Attorney General’s Manual states, “‘Law’ refers to the statutes which 
a particular agency administers, together with relevant judicial decisions.”258  At the very least, 
“law” should include the Constitution.  Most strictly to the affected party, some courts hold that 
only the organic statute can be the authorizing “law.”259  Some courts hold only federal law is the 
authorizing “law,” not state law.260  And most strictly to the agency, some courts hold that even 
the agency’s regulations can be the authorizing “law.”261  Depending on the meaning of “law,” 
the standards to which an agency subpoena or warrant could be held might be higher than the 
mere constitutional minimums discussed later.   
That is the extent of APA review for a party aggrieved by an agency investigation.  
Standard § 706 review does not apply to investigative acts because that provision requires “final 
agency action,” which agency investigations are definitionally not.262  The Supreme Court has 
held that an agency’s initiation of an investigation is not final agency action,263 which would 
reason to include antecedent investigatory acts—a decision that perhaps should have come out 
differently if decided today, given more recent Court cases and the analysis in this Article.  
Keying off that case, lower courts have held that certain investigation-related acts do not 
 
255 Pac. Westbound Conference v. United States, 332 F.2d 49, 53 n.10 (9th Cir. 1964). 
256 ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, supra note 111, 
at 69 (citing Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501 (1943); Okla. Press Pub’g Co. v. 
Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946); “Nothing the language of section 6(c) suggests any purpose to 
change this established rule.”).  See also City of Arlington v. FCC, 568 U.S. 290 (2013) 
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
257 In re FTC Corp. Patterns Report Litig., No. 76-0126, 1977 WL 1438, at *2 (D.D.C. July 11, 
1977) (citing United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950) and noting that that case was 
reviewed under § 555 alone and not § 706). 
258 ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, supra note 111, 
at 69. 
259 Belle Fourche Pipeline Co. v. United States, 554 F. Supp. 1350, 1358 (D. Wyo. 1983); see 
United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 646 (1950); see also Appeal of FTC Line of 
Bus. Report Litig., 595 F.2d 685 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (the “law” referred to is at least 
the agency’s organic statute). 
260 J.H. Kent v. Hardin, 425 F.2d 1346, 1350 (5th Cir. 1970). 
261 Id. 
262 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(13), 704. 
263 FTC v. Std. Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232, 239–45 (1980); Veldhoen v. U.S. Coast Guard, 35 F.3d 
222, 225 (5th Cir. 1994) (“An agency’s initiation of an investigation does not constitute final 
agency action.”). 
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constitute final agency action,264 including informational reports after investigation265 or certain 
decisions not to investigate.266 
That is not to say that no agency act associated with an investigation can be a final 
agency action.  Some courts in recent years have subverted the notion that such a bright line 
exists.  In 2016, the Supreme Court in U.S. Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes Co. held that an 
approved jurisdictional determination by the Corps is final agency action; the affected parties 
had successfully argued that the determination imposed practical burdens on them and so met the 
test of finality.267  Agency investigatory tools could constitute final agency action if the 
investigation is not ad hoc, but rather the agency has developed a program, policy, or practice of 
investigations that crosses the line into full rule territory.268   
Agency investigative acts are also arguably prosecutorial decisions (at least where the 
organic statute does not require the commencement of an investigation because of a specific 
trigger).269  This renders them presumptively unreviewable under Heckler v. Chaney or subject to 
the APA’s discretionary fiat270 via the organic statute.  The Constitution’s respect for horizontal 
separation of powers also compels that result.271  Thus, courts generally should generally refrain 
from inserting themselves into decisions of how agencies should use their resources.272  
But for immunity to be granted based on prosecutorial discretion, the statute must truly 
give the agency discretion to investigate or not investigate.  The D.C. Circuit recently found 
justiciable the Food and Drug Administration’s decision to decline to initiate certain enforcement 
 
264 E.g., Reliable Automatic Sprinkler Co. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n, 324 F.3d 726, 731 
(D.C. Cir. 2003); Martin v. Naval Criminal Investigative Serv., 539 F. App’x 830, 832 (9th Cir. 
2013); Mobil Exploration & Producing U.S., Inc. v. Dep’t of the Interior, 180 F.3d 1192, 1198–
99 (10th Cir. 1999). 
265 Parsons v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 878 F.3d 162, 169 (6th Cir. 2017); Joshi v. Nat’l Transp. 
Safety Bd., 791 F.3d 8, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2015); cf. United States v. L.A. & Salt Lake R.R. Co., 273 
U.S. 299, 309–10 (1927). 
266 Jallali v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 437 F. App’x 862, 865 (11th Cir. 2011). 
267 U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., 136 S. Ct. 1807 (2016); see also Rhea Lana, Inc. 
v. Dep’t of Labor, 824 F.3d 1023 (D.C. Cir. 2016); CSI Aviation Servs., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Transp., 637 F.3d 408, 412–13 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
268 U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. Kast Metals Corp., 744 F.2d 1147, 1150 (5th Cir. 1984). 
269 Gifford-Hill & Co. v. FTC, 523 F.2d 730, 733 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (dicta); In re FTC Corp. 
Patterns Report Litig., No. 76-0126, 1977 WL 1438, at *3 (D.D.C. July 11, 1977). 
270 5 U.S.C. § 701.  This is to the extent that investigative acts are not reviewable under, for 
example, 5 U.S.C. § 555(d). 
271 See, e.g., Memorandum from Patrick Philbin, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal 
Counsel, to Daniel J. Bryant, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legislative Affairs (Apr. 8, 2002); 
Peter L. Markowitz, Prosecutorial Discretion Power at Its Zenith: The Power to Protect Liberty, 
97 B.U. L. REV. 489, 541 n.280 (2017). 
272 Ronald M. Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative Law, 74 MINN. L. REV. 
689, 716 (1990). 
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actions after the court interpreted a statute to entirely deprive the FDA of discretion to decline.273  
The upshot is that Congress may, sometimes, directly cabin executive prosecutorial discretion, 
and by extension investigation discretion.274    
Whether an agency investigation can be challenged under 5 U.S.C. § 555(d) or § 706, 
parties have no ability to raise substantive defenses during the agency investigation that will bear 
on their enforcement proceeding: e.g., claims of collateral estoppel,275 allegations that the act 
upon which the investigation is based do not apply to respondents or that the respondents are not 
within the agency’s jurisdiction.276  As it stands, this raises a separation of powers consideration, 
as Chief Justice Roberts noted in his City of Arlington v. FCC dissent.277 
 One benefit the APA does provide challengers is their ability to be represented by 
counsel at a hearing or interview.  The Sixth Amendment right to counsel “does not attach until 
after the agency has moved beyond the investigative stage,”278  but the APA permits a party 
compelled to appear before an agency to be accompanied, represented, and advised by an 
attorney.279   
 As an additional minor point, one of the APA’s other few references to investigative 
action is its prohibition on administrative law judges being supervised by employees who 
investigate on behalf of the agency.280  Similarly, an investigating employee generally may not 
be involved in the decision except as witness or counsel. 281  A violation of these structural 
limitations would presumably give rise to a challenge that the agency action rendered was 
 
273 Cook v. FDA, 733 F.3d 1, 7–10 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
274 Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. FEC, 892 F.3d 434, 441 (D.C. Cir. 2018); 
see also Greer v. Chao, 492 F.3d 962, 965 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Giacobbi v. Biermann, 780 F. 
Supp. 33 (D.D.C. 1992)). 
275 FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d 862, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (en banc). 
276 FTC v. Ken Roberts Co., 276 F.3d 538, 584 (D.C. Cir. 2001); FMC v. Port of Seattle, 521 
F.2d 431 (9th Cir. 1975); SEC v. Savage, 513 F.2d 188 (7th Cir. 1975). 
277 568 U.S. 290, 327 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“[T]here is another concern at play, no 
less firmly rooted in our constitutional structure. That is the obligation of the Judiciary not only 
to confine itself to its proper role, but to ensure that the other branches do so as well.”). 
278 Ronald F. Wright, Organization of Adjudicative Offices in Executive Departments and 
Agencies, ACUS, 542 (1993), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1993-
Statement%2316%20Organization%20of%20Adjudicative%20Offices%20in%20Executive%20
Departments%20and%20Agencies.pdf; cf. Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25 (1976) (Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel is limited to criminal proceedings). 
279 5 U.S.C. § 555(b). 
280 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(2). 
281 Id. § 554(d). 
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unlawful for failing to observe required procedures.282  However, non-administrative law judges 
are not subject to these requirements.283  
ii. Non-APA Statutory Constraints 
Some agencies’ organic statutes erect additional constraints, both in terms of substantive 
controls or independent oversight.284  Under the Inspector General Act of 1978, inspectors 
general conduct and supervise audits and investigations relating to the programs and operations” 
of the executive departments.285  The Inspector General Act requires the agency to give its 
inspector general “timely access to all records, reports, audits, reviews, documents, papers, 
recommendations, or other materials available to the” agency and which “relate to” the inspector 
general’s responsibilities.286  The inspector general may also issue subpoenas, except to federal 
agencies.287  An inspector general may issue subpoenas to non-federal agencies and take 
testimony of “any person.”288 
These provisions have caused friction between the inspectors general and the heads of 
executive agencies, particularly the Federal Bureau of Investigation.  Some agency heads have 
contended that they alone hold the authority to release documents, and even if they do not, the 
agency head determines which documents are “relate[d]” to the programs and operations under 
review.289  Inspectors general have argued to the contrary, in favor of permitting access to 
agency records so that the agency cannot stonewall the inspector general.290   
The Freedom of Information Act provides another bulwark.  Under an earlier version of 
FOIA and case law from the 1970s, investigatory files remain exempt from public disclosure 
 
282 Id. § 706(2)(D). 
283 Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 311 (1955) (rejecting this challenge brought under the Due 
Process Clause). 
284 E.g., Letter from Fed. Trade Comm’n Inspector General Roslyn A. Mazer to House 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (Sept. 30, 2015), 
https://causeofaction.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/ORIGINAL-Signed-OIG-Letter-to-
HOGR-staff-9-30-2015.pdf. 
285 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1, 2, et seq.  Some agencies have their inspector general authorized under 
other authorities.  See generally CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, STATUTORY INSPECTORS 
GENERAL IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: A PRIMER app. B (Jan. 3, 2019), 
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45450/4. 
286 Id. § 6(a)(1). 
287 Id. § 6(a)(4). 
288 Id. § 6(a)(5). 
289 Office of the Inspector General, Statement of Michael E. Horowitz Inspector General, U.S. 
Department of Justice before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and 
Government Reform concerning “Obstructing Oversight:  Concerns from Inspectors General”, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE: OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. (Sept. 10, 2014), 
https://oig.justice.gov/testimony/t140909.pdf. 
290 Id. 
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even after agency proceedings terminated.291  But now, an agency must produce a requested 
record unless its disclosure meets one of six conditions, such as that it “could reasonably be 
expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings” or could disclose law enforcement 
techniques.292   
Under that broad rubric, regulated entities can use FOIA to request information on 
investigations.293  For example, ProPublica has used FOIA to research the Department of Health 
and Human Services and the investigation close out letters it sent to healthcare providers.294  
Related to FOIA, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission releases a full set of materials 
contained in a charge file at the conclusion of its investigation, although apparently only to the 
person who filed the charge under its own statute.295  The FOIA constraint is of limited efficacy.  
Courts tend to defer to agencies in their assertions of exemptions.296  Agencies are 
disincentivized from complying with the requests.297  FOIA responses are also only as good as 
the information that the agency collects, which can be limited.298   
Another statute that provides protections is the Privacy Act of 1974.  The Act is useful 
not because it substantively limits how an agency undertakes its investigative acts, but because it 
limits the fruits of those acts—thereby serving as a backend check.  This Act prohibits federal 
agencies from “disclos[ing] any record which is contained in a system of records by any means” 
to another agency unless the individual whose information is in the record consents, or if the 
disclosure would be for a “routine use” or for a “civil or criminal law enforcement activity” 
provided a certain written request is made.299  A “routine use” is defined as “the use of such 
record for a purpose which is compatible with the purpose for which it was collected[.]”300  The 
“law enforcement activity” exception is broader than criminal investigations, and does not 
require an active investigation or a “current law enforcement necessity.”301  The agency faces 
penalties for violations.  For example, if an agency releases records to another agency without an 
exception to the Privacy Act, liability can lie against the government under the Federal Tort 
Claims Act.302  Relatedly, for several agencies, the agency’s employees are subject to criminal 
 
291 See, e.g., SEC v. Frankel, 460 F.2d 813 (2d Cir. 1973).  Accord Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 
424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
292 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7). 
293 Margaret B. Kwoka, First-Person FOIA, 127 YALE L.J. 2204 (2018). 
294 Id. at 2212 (citing Charles Ornstein, The Secret Documents that Detail How Patients’ Privacy 
Is Breached, PROPUBLICA (July 21, 2016), http://www.propublica.org/article/the-secret-
documents-that-detail-how-patients-privacy-is-breached). 
295 Id. at 2238. 
296 Aram A. Gavoor & Daniel Miktus, Oversight of Oversight: A Proposal for More Effective 
FOIA Reform, 66 CATH. U. L. REV. 525, 535–37 (2017). 
297 Id. at 529–31 (describing how agencies take advantage of FOIA’s ambiguities and gaps). 
298 Kwoka, supra note 293, at 2221. 
299 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(3), (7). 
300 Id. § 552a(a)(4). 
301 Maydak v. United States, 363 F.3d 512, 517 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
302 Doe v. DiGenova, 779 F.2d 74, 88 (D.C. Cir. 1985); see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671–2680. 
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penalties (fines of up to $5,000 and imprisonment of up to a year) for disclosing any information 
obtained by the agency (presumably through its investigation) without the agency’s authority.303   
Given the difficulties and challenges that an agency faces at the end of an investigative act with 
collected information, the Privacy Act provides another incentive for agencies to carefully 
conduct their investigations and to be careful with what they do with the information obtained 
through their investigations. 
C. Executive Branch Constraints 
The Executive Branch can and occasionally does self-impose limiting principles to its 
investigative practices.  The latest iteration of this behavior—at the time of this writing—is a 
2020 executive order, Executive Order 13,924, Executive Order on Regulatory Relief to Support 
Economic Recovery, which enunciated ten “principles of fairness in administrative enforcement 
and adjudication” that agencies should consider in revising their “procedures and practices.”304  
Most notably, Section 6(g) states that “[a]dministrative enforcement should be free of improper 
Government coercion.”305  The efficacy of Presidential actions to cause behavioral change is 
contingent on the will across executive branch agencies to enforce them as well as the variable 
agency-specific interpretations of the meaning of “coercion” and the types of “governmental 
coercion” that is “improper.”306  And, when agencies comply with executive orders, agencies’ 
interpretations can naturally vary.307  However, in furtherance of Section 6 of Executive Order 
13,924, the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs issued an implementing memo with 
over twenty unique best practices for agencies to consider and apply to their rules of procedure 
and management.308  By December 2020, multiple cabinet agencies had modified their rules.309  
As with any presidential action, Executive Order 13,924 and its corresponding implementation 
 
303 See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(i)(1). 
304 Exec. Order No. 13,924, 85 Fed. Reg. 31353 (May 19, 2020). 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-regulatory-relief-support-
economic-recovery/  
305 Id. § 6(g). 
306 Peter Raven-Hansen, Making Agencies Follow Orders: Judicial Review of Agency Violations 
of Executive Order 12,291, 1983 DUKE L.J. 285, 290–91. 
307 See Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 4 (1965) (counseling judicial deference to reasonable 
agency interpretations of executive orders). 
308 Paul J. Ray, Administrator, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, M-20-31, 
Implementation of Section 6 of Executive Order 13924 (Aug. 31, 2020). 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/M-20-31.pdf. 
309 See, e.g., Susan Parker Bodine, Assistant Administrator for Enforcement and Compliance 
Assurance, Environmental Protection Agency, Implementation of Executive Order 13,924 (Nov. 
25, 2020) https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2020-
11/documents/implementationofexecutiveorder13924.pdf; Steven G. Bradbury, General Counsel, 
U.S. Department of Transportation, Implementation of Section 6 of Executive Order 13,924 
(Nov. 13, 2020) https://www.transportation.gov/mission/enforcement/implementation-section-6-
executive-order-13924. 
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could be revoked in the discretion of the President, which underscores the limited benefit of 
executive branch constraints. 
IV. WHY INVESTIGATIVE ACTS SHOULD BE CHECKED 
Having set out what agency investigations are and how they are permitted, we now ask: 
Are investigative acts a good and useful thing, given the inadequate constraints under the law to 
advance their legitimate purpose in the constitutional system?  In this Part, we aim to determine 
the positive and negative aspects of investigative acts.  Knowing what investigative acts are 
capable of, and their consequences, helps inform whether more or fewer constraints on 
investigative acts are necessary. 
A. The Benefits of Agency Civil Investigative Behavior 
Agency investigations provide Americans with significant benefits.  The Attorney 
General’s Committee acknowledged this before the passage of the APA, calling it “imperative” 
that a “careful investigation” take place before an agency commences formal proceedings.310  
Indeed, at least for rulemaking, the Attorney General’s Committee saw “the investigation, or 
study, of the problems to be dealt with” as one of the four distinct stages in administrative 
rulemaking.311  The Supreme Court, too, has noted that “it does not follow that an administrative 
agency charged with seeing that the laws are enforced may not have and exercise powers of 
original inquiry.”312 
Agencies execute the Executive Branch’s general constitutional mandate from the 
confluence of organic statutes and the Take Care clause.313  The President cannot personally see 
to the creation and implementation of policy for the entire U.S. federal government, and 
consequently needs a bureaucracy to carry out the functions of the President and other officers of 
the United States.  Agencies enforce the law and investigate numerous subjects, including 
fraud,314 corruption,315 forgery,316 public health.317  Agencies strive to achieve these goals in 
 
310 ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, supra note 47, at 62. 
311 Id. at 102. 
312 United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642 (1950). 
313 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 5. 
314 U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., FACT SHEET, 
https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/ebsa/about-ebsa/our-activities/resource-center/fact-
sheets/ebsa-monetary-results.pdf (last visited Dec. 17, 2020) (describing how in Fiscal Year 
2018, the Employee Benefits Security Administration had enforced the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act by closing 1,329 civil investigations and collecting over $807.7 million). 
315 DEP’T OF STATE, FOREIGN OPERATIONS & RELATED PROGRAMS, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET 
JUSTIFICATION (Mar. 11, 2019), 
https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1868/FY_2020_CBJ.pdf.  
316 Id.  
317 DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
JUSTIFICATION OF ESTIMATES FOR APPROPRIATION COMMITTEES, 
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many situations.  Evidence of a regulatory violation frequently resides solely within the hands of 
the regulated entity.   
Investigative action helps agencies achieve their respective statutory and executive 
mandates.318  Accordingly, the Supreme Court has recognized that the constitutional basis for 
agency investigative acts “would seem clearly to be comprehended in the ‘necessary and proper’ 
clause, as incidental to both [Congress’s] general legislative and its investigative powers.”319  As 
Professor Davis wrote the year after the enactment of the APA, “Investigations are useful for all 
administrative functions, not only for rule-making, adjudication, and licensing, but also for 
prosecuting, for supervising and directing, for determining general policy, for recommending 
legislation, and for purposes no more specific than illuminating obscure areas to find out what if 
anything should be done.”320  Professor Sunstein has argued that agencies have evolved to 
become “modern America’s common law courts,” meaning they “specify abstract standards 
(often involving reasonableness) and to adapt legal rules to particular contexts as facts, social 
understandings of facts, and underlying values change over time.”321  The ability to investigate 
furnishes agencies with the facts to be used in such a “common law court” that are a necessary 
predicate to agency action.  That said, as the Supreme Court recently recognized, agencies’ 
decisions are “routinely informed” by considerations external to the affected parties: 
considerations of politics, foreign relations, and the national security.322  The difference in what 
agencies do and what agencies regulate may lead to different uses, and abuses, of agency 
investigations.323 
 Investigations can save resources for the agency and, collaterally, the regulated parties.  
Investigative actions allow the agency to explore whether to commence an agency action without 
committing to doing so and under the freedoms recognized by Heckler.  An agency saves 
resources by looking into an issue within the agency’s enforcement domain without fully 
committing the agency to pursuing final action.324 
 
https://www.cdc.gov/budget/documents/fy2021/fy-2021-cdc-congressional-justification.pdf (last 
visited Dec. 17, 2020). 
318 HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 19, § 8.1; Jack W. Campbell IV, Revoking the “Fishing 
License:” Recent Decisions Place Unwarranted Restrictions on Administrative Agencies’ Power 
to Subpoena Personal Financial Records, 49 VAND. L. REV. 395, 396 (1996). 
319 Okla. Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 214 (1946). 
320 Davis, supra note 13, at 1111.  The word “prosecution” in this quote seems to mean civil 
prosecution, not criminal prosecution.  The APA uses the same term in a civil manner as well.  5 
U.S.C. § 554(d)(2). 
321 Cass R. Sunstein, Is Tobacco A Drug? Administrative Agencies as Common Law Courts, 47 
DUKE L.J. 1013, 1019 (1998). 
322 Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2573 (2019). 
323 Bagby, supra note 7, at 349 (“The courts and the Congress should reevaluate investigatory 
powers if evidence mounts of abuse by either regulators or ‘targets.’”). 
324 Campbell, supra note 318, at 434. 
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Agency investigations can serve as a platform upon which it can bring attention to issues; 
“[a]gencies may be able to solve collective action problems by . . . more readily generating 
media attention.”325  So, too, can agency investigations lead Congress to legislate.326  Agencies 
have been observed to use their civil powers appropriately.327  Due to the nebulous and largely 
non-public nature of administrative investigations, the benefits that they generate evade precise 
measurement: “[t]he costs and benefits of government investigations are diffuse.”328 
B. Abuses of Agency Civil Investigative Practice 
There are numerous problematic aspects of how agencies are currently undertaking their 
investigatory rights, obligations, and privileges.  Since the twentieth century, government 
agencies have been “flush with power to make highly informal decisions affecting people, where 
‘the usual quality of justice’ may be quite low.”329  This is especially problematic where those 
decisions are discretionary, because agencies may find discretionary actions to be “tempting 
levels to create favorable perceptions,” “as a sort of signal that the public (or political superiors) 
can use in forming judgments about the competence” of the agency.330  As the Supreme Court 
admonished in a 1936 opinion from the era in which the Court viewed agency investigations 
with skepticism, permitting an agency to compel individuals to produce evidence in the absence 
of jurisdiction “violates the cardinal precept upon which the constitutional safeguards of personal 
liberty ultimately rest,” and places the government at risk of “becom[ing] an autocracy.”331 
Agency investigations deploy immense investigatory power to target individuals and 
entities with crippling and voluminous document, inspection, and interview requests.332  The 
announcement of an investigation can affect share prices as well as investor and public 
confidence.333  When it was publicly revealed that the Department of Justice and the Federal 
Trade Commission were launching antitrust investigations into Facebook, Amazon, and 
Google’s parent company, those companies’ shares dropped 7.5%, 4.6%, and 6.1%, 
respectively.334 
 
325 Cuéllar, supra note 79, at 286. 
326 Davis, supra note 13, at 1117. 
327 See H.R. Rep. No. 1321, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & 
Ad. News 3874, 3877. 
328 In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 312 (6th Cir. 
2002) (Boggs, J., dissenting). 
329 Cuéllar, supra note 79, at 279 (citing KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 216 
(1969)). 
330 Id. at 263. 
331 Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1, 23–24 (1936). 
332 Okla. Press Pub’g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 218–19 (1946) (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
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Improperly scoped agency investigations can stifle individual freedoms.  Once under 
investigation, an individual or entity may enter the orbit of criminal penalties in responding to 
government requests for information.  A misstep in the presentation of a material fact can 
theoretically carry criminal consequences because making false statements in a matter within the 
jurisdiction of the executive branch is a crime335 as is corrupt interference in an official 
proceeding.336  Under the FTC’s organic statute—which applies to the many other agencies for 
which their respective organic statutes incorporate the FTC’s—a person who “neglect[s] or 
refuse[s]” to attend, testify, answer lawful inquiries, or produce documentary evidence in 
response to a federal district court order directing compliance with the agency’s order commits a 
crime punishable by a fine up to $5,000, or one year of imprisonment.337 
Less directly, an agency can use a civil administrative investigation to bolster a parallel 
criminal case.338  An agency can often avoid judicial review and thereby strengthen its 
enforcement leverage.339  Short of criminal penalties, an agency can also take adverse action 
against an employee for making false statements during an investigation of alleged misconduct 
by the employee.340  Although the government may lawfully engage in “good faith” parallel civil 
 
335 18 U.S.C. § 1001; see, e.g., United States v. Stover, 499 F. App’x 267 (4th Cir. 2012) 
(affirming the conviction of a mine security director who had lied during an administrative 
agency deposition he voluntarily sat for). 
336 18 U.S.C. §§ 1505, 1512(c). 
337 15 U.S.C. § 50 (Federal Trade Commission), incorporated by 7 U.S.C. § 1636(i)(3) 
(Department of Agriculture for livestock mandatory reporting); 21 U.S.C. § 467d (Food and 
Drug Administration to enforce poultry and poultry products inspection); 26 U.S.C. § 5274 
(Internal Revenue Service to enforce the collection of alcohol, tobacco, and certain other excise 
taxes); 27 U.S.C. § 202(g) (Department of Treasury to enforce the Federal Alcohol 
Administration Act); 29 U.S.C. § 209 (Department of Labor Wage and Hour Division to enforce 
the Fair Labor Standards Act).  Criminal charges have been successfully brought under such 
statutes. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 413 F.3d 727, 728 (8th Cir. 2005). 
338 Anthony O’Rourke, Parallel Enforcement and Agency Interdependence, 77 MD. L. REV. 985, 
986–87 (2018) (citing the case of SAC Capital’s Mathew Martoma, who was pursued by both the 
SEC and the U.S. Attorney’s Office; “the SEC shared every document it obtained through civil 
discovery from SAC Capital with prosecutors,” and “SEC attorneys and SDNY prosecutors also 
jointly conducted twenty interviews of a dozen witnesses”); Berkower, supra note 90, at 2265, 
2286–87 (citing the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, which “marked the first 
time that Congress granted th[e] broad [administrative] investigative subpoena power solely for 
criminal law enforcement purposes,” citing a delegation to the Attorney General in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3486(a)(1)(B)(i), although as of 2005 the Attorney General had delegated this power only to 
AUSAs and the Criminal Division, not the Federal Bureau of Investigation, allowing them to 
perform a gatekeeping function). 
339 Rachel E. Barkow, Overseeing Agency Enforcement, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1129, 1137 
(2016). 
340 LaChance v. Erikson, 522 U.S. 262, 268 (1998). 
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and criminal investigations, the standards for “good faith” are indeterminate, and even when met 
the agencies may freely exchange information without prior notice to the regulated party.341 
Agency investigations can pose existential threats to the regulated entities.  In addition to 
the case of LabMD cited in Part I,342 the Consumer Product Safety Commission aggressively 
investigated a company that produced rare earth magnetic office-desk toys on the grounds that 
they were unsafe; the agency pursued personal liability against the CEO and ultimately causing 
the company to be dissolved and jobs to be lost while competitors continued to conduct business 
unabated.343 
Even short of existential threats, zealous investigations can unduly vex regulated parties.  
The Internal Revenue Service conceded in 2013 to screening organizations’ applications for tax-
exempt status for politically loaded terms.344  The IRS’s exempt organizations office would 
search for conservative-associated terms like “Tea Party,” “patriots,” or “9/12,” and progressive-
leaning terms like “progressive,” “occupy,” and “green energy.”345  The agency would then 
subject such groups to heightened scrutiny and request additional information from them.346 
Targets of agency investigations may not have the resources to defend against 
investigations or subsequent multi-year enforcement actions, and instead enter into judicially 
unreviewable consent decrees.  All of these consequences of unsound investigative action can be 
exacerbated by “regulatory overlap.”347  A regulatory breach might carry both civil 
administrative and criminal consequences and an agency might partner with the Department of 
Justice to investigate.348  This could be ripe for abuse and undermine public faith in rule of law 
and law enforcement.  For example, there is the prospect that an administrative sanction can 
serve as a pretext for a criminal investigation, theoretically allowing the agency and prosecutors 
to take advantage of the lower constitutional standard for administrative subpoenas versus 
criminal warrants.   
 
341 Persaud, supra note 207, at 89–90. 
342 See supra Part I. 
343 Federal Regulators Suing Buckyballs Founder in Rare Product Recall Case, WASH. POST 
(Jan. 5, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/federal_government/federal-regulators-
suing-buckyballs-founder-in-rare-product-recall-case/2014/01/05/5b8c19ec-5087-11e3-a7f0-
b790929232e1_story.html. 
344 Justice Department Settles with Conservative Groups over IRS Scrutiny, REUTERS (Oct. 26, 
2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-tax-conservative/justice-department-settles-with-
conservative-groups-over-irs-scrutiny-idUSKBN1CV1TY. 
345 Id.; Alan Rappeport, In Targeting Political Groups, I.R.S. Crossed Party Lines, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/05/us/politics/irs-targeting-tea-party-liberals-
democrats.html. 
346 Justice Department Settles with Conservative Groups over IRS Scrutiny, supra note 356. 
347 Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L. 
REV. 1131, 1138–51 (2012). 
348 O’Rourke, supra note 350. 
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Scholars have identified agency over-regulation in the setting of rulemaking (and agency 
investigations preceding rulemaking).349  In the aggregate, regulatory overlap creates 
redundancy, which increases the cumulative cost of agency action and thus, presumably, the 
antecedent agency investigations.350  The same overlap concerns should hold true for agency 
investigations preceding enforcement or adjudication.  That setting faces an additional problem: 
“multiple potential enforcers who undoubtedly already have jurisdiction over an issue might 
have incentives to show enforcement zeal, even if duplicating others’ efforts.”351  
Conversely, regulatory overlap could actually incentivize under-regulation in the face of 
regulatory overlap: the “regulatory commons” effect.352  Under this theory, overlapping agency 
jurisdiction can actually stymie agency action (and agency investigations),353 assuming that one 
agency has not naturally become the prime or traditional regulatory of an issue despite others’ 
potential authority.354  There may even be some advantages to regulatory overlap and 
administrative crossfire, such as overcoming regulatory inertia, breaking down jurisdictional 
barriers, and spurring regulatory innovation.355  However, these doctrines should be viewed in 
consideration of modern Congresses, which have been riven with legislative torpor.356 
Reputational harms may be at stake because agencies are inconsistent, sometime 
internally, with how they publicly address their investigative work.357  But some have called out, 
for example, the FTC’s “practices of ‘issuing news releases and the adverse effects resulting 
therefrom,” to which the D.C. Circuit and Congress “had essentially acquiesced.”358  Often, the 
 
349 See generally J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Mozart and the Red Queen: The Problem of 
Regulatory Accretion in the Administrative State, 91 GEORGETOWN L.J. 757 (2003). 
350 Robert B. Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 863, 897 (2006). 
351 William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory Gaps, 89 
IOWA L. REV. 1, 29 n.81 (2003). 
352 Id. at 22, 27. 
353 Id. 
354 Id. at 29 n.81. 
355 Catherine M. Sharkey, Agency Coordination in Consumer Protection, 2013 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
329, 334 (citing Ahdieh, supra note 362, at 882–83). 
356 See Drew DeSilver, A Productivity Scorecard for the 115th Congress: More Laws than 
Before, But Not More Substance, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Jan. 25, 2019), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/01/25/a-productivity-scorecard-for-115th-
congress/; Mark Murray, Unproductive Congress: How Stalemates Became the Norm in 
Washington DC, NBC NEWS (June 30, 2013), 
http://firstread.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/06/30/19206400-unproductive-congress-how-
stalemates-became-the-norm-in-washington-dc; Michael Ellement, The Supreme Court Meets a 
Gridlocked Congress, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. ARGUENDO 116 (2016). 
357 Nathan Cortez, Adverse Publicity by Administrative Agencies in the Internet Era, 2011 
B.Y.U. L. REV. 1371. 
358 Id. at 1386; see Commission Closing Letters, FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/closing-letters-and-other-public-
statements/commission-closing-letters (last visited Dec. 17, 2020) (listing the FTC’s letters 
announcing the close of investigations).  
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reputational risk is built into the statute.  If the Securities and Exchange Commission censures a 
business association, that entity can face additional disclosure requirements, ineligibility to 
obtain federal contracts, and the possibility of criminal proceedings, civil securities class actions, 
or shareholder derivative actions.359  Additionally, when persons affiliated with the business 
association (such as customers, vendors, moneylenders, shareholders, and employees) are 
contacted by the SEC, rumors can take root.360  The mere initiation of the investigation may be 
as damaging as a guilty verdict.361 
Agency investigations, even when appropriate, carry significant economic costs on the 
public fisc and on targets.  Taxpayers bear the brunt of most agency investigative costs.362  For 
example, for Fiscal Year 2019, the Federal Trade Commission requested an increase of 
$3,383,000 for “expert witness needs due to increased numbers of complex investigations and 
litigation in both competition and consumer protection matters.”363  The FTC requested a total 
appropriation of $309.7 million for Fiscal Year 2019.364  Under the now-lapsed Ethics in 
Government Act of 1978 and other authorities, independent counsel investigations, too, can cost 
millions of dollars to the independent counsel’s office and to the target defending against the 
charges.365  That said, some agencies return money to the Department of Treasury.  To again use 
the example of the FTC, the agency returns billions annually to Treasury.366  These costs might 
not affect or incentivize any particular agency behavior, but their costs are important to consider 
in appreciating the scope of investigative acts. 
Responding parties, too, can incur sizable monetary costs to respond to an 
investigation367.  For example, ignoring an Environmental Protection Agency information 
 
359 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AVOIDING AND RESPONDING TO MISCONDUCT § 14.06. 
360 Lewis B. Merrifield III, Investigations by the Securities and Exchange Commission, 32 BUS. 
LAW. 1583, 1594 (1977). 
361 Id.  Prosecutors may consider the collateral consequences of criminally prosecuting a 
corporate entity, which include “the possibly substantial consequences to a corporation’s 
employees, investors, pensioners, and customers, many of whom may, depending on the size and 
nature of the corporation and their role in its operations, have played no role in the criminal 
conduct, have been unaware of it, or have been unable to prevent it.”  DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE 
MANUAL § 9-28.1100.B, https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-28000-principles-federal-prosecution-
business-organizations (last visited Dec. 17, 2020). 
362 See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 318, at 435. 




365 Hanly A. Ingram, United States v. Tucker: Should Independent Counsels Investigate and 
Prosecute Ordinary Citizens?, 86 KY. L.J. 741, 768 (1997). 
366 FED. TRADE COMM’N, FISCAL YEAR 2021 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION 60 (Feb. 
10, 2020), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/fy-2021-congressional-budget-
justification/fy_2021_cbj_final.pdf. 
367 United States v. Am. Target Advert., Inc., 257 F.3d 348, 353–54 (4th Cir. 2001) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
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request could cost up to $25,000 per day of noncompliance.368  Not only can agencies engage in 
the above practices, but they may become comfortable doing so.  An agency might come into the 
agency investigation with—or develop over the course of the investigation—outcome-
determinative bias or preordination.  An agency has strong motives to do so in the absence of 
meaningful, systemic countermeasures.   
Absent an admission from an agency decisionmaker or a judicial finding, one might not 
be able to conclude that a particular agency is engaging in bad practices.  Agencies generally 
commence rulemaking procedures with an anticipated outcome—if the agency does not think the 
rule was fundamentally viable, it would not have started the rulemaking efforts.369  What a 
challenger might be able to show is that the agency is cutting corners based on precedent, past 
behavior, or political expediency.370  But it is very difficult to prove an unalterably closed 
mind.371  Even when the Supreme Court held the Secretary of Commerce had improperly used 
pretext to justify its asking of a new census question, it did not conclude that was foreclosed 
from reconsidering.372 
Another harm from improper agency investigations is more abstract: constitutional 
horizontal separation of powers concerns.  Many administrative agencies operate in a zone that is 
free of oversight from both the policy prerogatives of the First Branch and the oversight of the 
Third Branch, especially if the organic statute provides no guidelines or Article III review of 
investigative practices.  The result, anecdotally and systemically, is the risk of tyrannical 
behavior by agencies and within them, bureaucrats who are not politically accountable as 
principal or inferior officers of the United States under the Appointments Clause.373 
A key caveat must be reinforced in this assessment of the harms of overzealous agency 
investigations: it is impossible to know the full extent of how agencies are investigating.  To the 
extent such information even could be aggregated, agencies rarely report it publicly, such that 
one could readily research it.  Agencies generally do not report who and how they are 
investigating.374  Thus, not every agency will announce the commencement of an investigation, 
 
368 United States v. Gurley, 384 F.3d 316, 324 (6th Cir. 2004) (validating the assessment of civil 
penalties of up to $25,000 per day for noncompliance per 42 U.S.C. § 9604(e)(5)(B), and 
affirming the levy of a smaller amount against a defendant,  $1.9 million for seven years of 
willful noncompliance). 
369 See Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2573 (2019); FTC v. Cement Institute, 
333 U.S. 683, 700–03 (1948). 
370 United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 265–66 (1954) (holding that an 
agency must follow its own regulations). 
371 Air Transp. Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Nat’l Mediation Bd., 663 F.3d 476, 487-488 (D.C. Cir. 
2011). 
372 Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2573–76 (2019). 
373 See Jennifer L. Mascott, Who Are “Officers of the United States”?, 70 STAN. L. REV. 443 
(2018). 
374 For instance, “[i]n general, the Department of Justice does not publicly announce 
investigations or investigative findings.”  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., When Does 
the Division Announce Investigations?, https://www.justice.gov/crt/when-does-division-
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detail an expansion of the investigation’s scope, or issue close-out letters.375  Even when an 
agency provides a “cold comfort letter” announcing that it harbors no present intentions to take 
additional enforcement action against an entity, such letters are often not enforceable and give no 
indication as to when an investigation might come back to life.376 
This potential for the above abuse is real and has been occasionally recognized since the 
rise of the Administrative State.  Over 70 years ago,  Justice Murphy, dissenting in Oklahoma 
Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, noted with trepidation the metastatic growth of the 
administrative state (which has only accelerated since he wrote in 1946).377  He implored agency 
investigators to feel “a new and broader sense of responsibility,” lest they succumb to the “open 
invitation to abuse” the immense power of agency investigations and repeat the missteps of the 
pre-Revolution British monarchy.378  “Only by confining the subpoena power exclusively to the 
judiciary,” Justice Murphy opined, “can there be any insurance against this corrosion of 
liberty.”379 
The concurrences in the 1985 Heckler v. Chaney opinion expressed trepidation that the 
majority opinion “empowered” agencies to administratively close investigations.  Justice 
Brennan, concurring, listed circumstances in which he believed that, statutory language aside, 
non-enforcement decisions should be reviewable.380  Justice Marshall’s separate concurrence 
went further, arguing that district courts had invented remedies aimed at agencies to ensure 
“administrative fidelity to congressional objectives.”381  In his view, the majority’s creation of a 
“presumption of unreviewability” was an act of the Supreme Court failing to use “a scalpel 
rather than a blunderbuss” to correct those remedies Justice Marshall posited that “[t]raditional 
principles of rationality and fair process do offer ‘meaningful standards’ and ‘law to apply’ to an 
 
announce-investigations (last updated Oct. 18, 2018).  The Department of Justice justifies its 
policy by citing the possibility that a premature announcement may impair the Department’s 
ability to build a case, as well as the possible prejudice to the responding party.  Id.  However, 
the Department may announce investigations when they result in enforcement action or when 
law enforcement entities are involved.  Id.  
375 Some agencies do, after the fact, report certain statistics on investigations opened, for 
example, the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST 
DIV., WORKLOAD STATISTICS, https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/788426/download (last visited 
Dec. 17, 2020).   
376 Fresenius Medical Care v. United States, 526 F.3d 372, 374–76 (8th Cir. 2008); Jonathan 
Cone et al., Negotiating False Claims Act Settlements, 14-3 BRPAPERS 1, 14-3 Briefing Papers 
1, 10 (2014); see, e.g., Debtors’ Mot. For Entry of an Order Authorizing, but Not Directing, the 
Debtors’ Entry into the Settlement Agreement & Approving the Settlement of the Qui Tam 
Claims and Related Matters, In re Trident Holding Co., No. 19-10384 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. filed 
Aug. 29, 2019), Dkt. 837. 
377 Okla. Press Pub’g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 218 (1950) (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
378 Id. at 218–19. 
379 Id. at 219. 
380 Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 839 (1985) (Brennan, J. concurring) (internal citations 
omitted). 
381 Id. at 852 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment only). 
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agency’s decision not to act, and no presumption of unreviewability should be allowed to trump 
these principles.”382 
Justice Marshall’s points may gain greater force when read in light of one of the 
majority’s key justifications and considering how that justification has aged.  The majority 
concluded that agency exercises of administrative civil prosecutorial discretion are 
presumptively non-reviewable, as “[a]n agency generally cannot act against each technical 
violation of the statute it is charged with enforcing.”383  As showcased above, the empirical 
predicate of Heckler may be eroding, especially in light of the possibility of technology-
facilitated total enforcement.  At minimum, it is a clear expression of the Court justifying its 
holding based on an agency’s limited ability to enforce at high volumes, which implies a similar 
limitation on its ability to investigate. 
The above harms are all the more important to study considering the potential for 
disruptive new technologies to increase agencies’ abilities to investigate.  The deployment of 
machine learning384 and other artificial intelligence-based technologies that are already pervasive 
in the criminal justice system385 have begun to change the Administrative State.  Researchers 
recently applied machine learning to analyze existing satellite data to identify previously 
unknown industrial animal farms known in North Carolina for Clean Water Act enforcement.386  
This transaction evidences how transformative, scalable, and affordable artificial intelligence can 
be for administrative investigative practices.387  By replicating and improving upon human 
cognitive and personnel capability, artificial intelligence harkens the possibility of a total 
enforcement environment where many more regulatory violations could be brought to account.388  
 
382 Id. at 854. 
383 Id. at 831 (majority op.). 
384 “Machine learning” is a type of artificial intelligence that uses algorithms to construct 
computer models that analyze large data sets, typically to predict the future.  See Federal Agency 
Data Mining Reporting Act of 2007, 42 U.S.C. § 2000ee-3(b)(1)(A) (2012) (“The term ‘data 
mining’ means a program involving pattern-based queries, searches, or other analyses of 1 or 
more electronic databases . . . to discover or locate a predictive pattern or anomaly indicative of 
terrorist or criminal activity . . . .”) 
385 Emily Berman, A Government of Laws and Not of Machines, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1277, 1293 
(2018). 
386 Laura Poppick, Environment Watchdogs Harness AI to Track Overflowing Factory-Farm 
Waste, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (Apr. 11, 2019), 
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/environment-watchdogs-harness-ai-to-track-
overflowing-factory-farm-waste/.  
387 Harry Surden, Machine Learning and Law, 89 WASH. L. REV. 87, 88 (2014) (“In the last few 
decades, researchers have successfully used machine learning to automate a variety of 
sophisticated tasks that were previously presumed to require human cognition.”).  These tasks 
include language translation, vehicle driving, revealing bank fraud, calculating credit risk, and so 
forth. 
388 The seminal case that rendered administrative prosecutorial discretion presumptively 
unreviewable was undergirded by an assumption that “agency generally cannot act against each 
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In light of this exercise of administrative power, it is necessary to consider the limiting principles 
that are in place to guide agencies in the increasing likely hypothetical scenario in which one 
decides to run an inspection-enforcement program that involves mailing packages full of 
machine sight-enabled drones to map, examine, and inspect a warehouse and every product 
running in an assembly line, and then transmit the data on a 5G wireless network to a 
government supercomputer that is running a deep learning389 algorithm to test the possible 
violation of numerous statutes and regulations. 
In sum, while investigative acts are necessary to agencies fulfilling their constitutional and 
statutory duties, they also open the door to unaccountable abuse.  
VI. APPLYING MEANINGFUL CONSTRAINTS TO AGENCY INVESTIGATIONS 
As this Article has demonstrated, there is no currently-applied meaningful constraint to 
investigative acts that violate the Constitution or statutes.  Professor Davis observed 73 years ago 
that “[n]arrow judicial interpretations have given rise to strikingly large grants of power.”390  His 
observation remains correct today.  As applied by the courts, the APA does not provide for 
meaningful or timely judicial review to challenge agency subpoenas or other process due to the 
“authorized by law” substantive standard.  While that phrase is textually capacious, courts have 
construed it narrowly.  The marginally less deferential § 706(2) judicial review provision of the 
APA, which assesses whether an agency act is “arbitrary or capricious,” is hamstrung by the 
requirement that the tool be “final agency action.”  
Since 1950, the Supreme Court has given little effect to many of the individual liberty 
provisions of the Constitution, which are incorporated by the APA’s “authorized by law” 
standard.  The standards that apply to agency subpoenas, warrants, or other investigative 
techniques need only meet minimal thresholds such as be not “unduly burdensome,” or 
“reasonably relevant.”  Regulated entities should recognize and use other tools to shed light on 
the murky area of agency investigations.   
First, individuals and entities should make more robust use of existing judicial constraints 
and push courts to expand the boundaries of judicial review.391  This is not an easy task, given 
courts’ tendencies to uphold investigative acts under the thinking that “[j]udicial supervision of 
agency decisions to investigate might hopelessly entangle the courts in areas that would prove to 
 
technical violation of the statute it is charged with enforcing.”  Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 
831 (1985). 
389 Deep learning is a term for a strand of AI processes by which a computer program refines its 
own internal models to improve its ability to process a set of information.  LeCun, Bengio, & 
Hinton, Deep Learning, 521 NATURE 436 (2015). 
390 Davis, supra note 13, at 1117. 
391 Rachel E. Barkow, Overseeing Agency Enforcement, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1129, 1162 
(2016) (describing advantages of judicial review of agency enforcement practices). 
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be unmanageable and would certainly throw great amounts of sand into the gears of the 
administrative process.”392   
The greatest potential source of assistance for helping guard against abusive agency 
investigations may be the Fourth Amendment.  The Supreme Court, upon being confronted with 
the issue, should revisit the current state of the law by more closely reviewing agencies’ 
interpretations of their investigations and investigative acts.393   
To accomplish that, courts could create a better remedy for an overbroad, burdensome, or 
ultra vires subpoena or warrant.  The current review regime is almost unassailably deferential to 
the agency, offers a remedy of simply having the agency limit the scope of the subpoena, and 
makes the respondent wait until the commencement and termination of agency adjudication to be 
able to challenge the agency, at which point the challenge can be practically, if not legally, moot.  
Courts can simply grant declaratory relief to plaintiffs with limiting instructions.  More careful 
Fourth Amendment scrutiny would deter the agency from being overbroad or needlessly 
intrusive from the start, especially given the disincentives responding parties face to contesting 
such improper investigative acts.394  Litigants and judges should also pay very close attention to 
the agencies’ enabling statutes and ensure that agency investigative powers are authorized by the 
statute.  More modern views of statutory interpretation techniques since Oklahoma Press 
Publishing and Morton Salt could lead courts to arrive at new conclusions about what, precisely, 
Congress has actually authorized an agency to do with regard to an individual or entity it is 
investigating.  Relatedly, a challenger might seek reexamination of a 1947 Supreme Court 
decision that absent an explicit statutory prohibition, an agency head may delegate down the 
chain of command to sign and issue subpoenas.395 
The Supreme Court should balance the separated powers against the odd and problematic 
state of administrative law, today.  These constitutional arguments are not wholly new.  The 
Supreme Court endorsed them in pre-World War II cases, when the Court was much more 
skeptical of agency investigatory techniques.396  A resurgence of those cases’ reasoning would 
help rein in abusive investigations.  One part of that resurgence could perhaps be the resurrection 
of the Supreme Court’s limitation of subpoenas to where “the sacrifice of privacy is necessary—
those where the investigations concern a specific breach of the law.”397  Litigants could also 
appeal to the Court’s bygone concern of roving inquiries into regulated parties’ records and 
 
392 SEC v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 648 F.2d 118, 127 n.12 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc) 
(quoting Dresser Indus., Inc. v. United States, 596 F.2d 1231, 1235 n.1 (5th Cir. 1979)). 
393 Persaud, supra note 207, at 89–90. 
394 See Robert L. Glicksman & Emily Hammond, The Administrative Law of Regulatory Slop 
and Strategy, 68 DUKE L.J. 1651, 1686–88 (2019) (arguing for remedies to clean up “regulatory 
slop,” such as fee-shifting provisions, injunctions, tailored instructions on remand, and the 
contempt power). 
395 Fleming v. Mohawk Wrecking & Lumber Co., 331 U.S. 111, 121–22 (1947). 
396 Scherb, supra note 136, at 1079. 
397 Harriman v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 211 U.S. 407, 419–20 (1908) (emphasis 
added). 
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conduct, which it previously deemed as “contrary to the first principles of justice.”398  Those 
barriers fell with Oklahoma Press Publishing in 1946,399 but they could be restored.  Such a view 
would dovetail with the recent, general judicial evolution toward closer inspection of agency 
activity.400  
Specifically, the Court should revisit Oklahoma Press Publishing and Morton Salt, which 
discounted stare decisis to make the very deferential Fourth Amendment case law in force today.  
The Court should apply a standard for quashing agency subpoenas or warrants with fidelity to 
the requirement that only the organic statute provides the agency authority to perform an 
investigative act.  In so doing, the Court should eschew constraints such as the limitation that 
investigative acts not be performed in “bad faith,” which arguably reserves discretion for judges 
to be lax in policing the use of investigative acts.  The Court should consider setting probable 
cause as the standard for issuing an administrative warrant, especially given the potential for a 
civil investigation founded on an administrative warrant to morph into a criminal 
investigation.401  Courts should also prohibit administratively-obtained investigative materials 
from being used against the producing party in a criminal case unless such material could have 
been obtained in a criminal investigation under the Fourth Amendment. 
The Fifth Amendment should be reinvigorated in this arena.  Courts should recognize a 
due process property and liberty interest to more-robustly challenge an administrative 
investigation that is onerous and abusive.  This could be a corollary to the current Fourth 
Amendment defense against unduly burdensome investigations.  This interest might protect, for 
example, parties from having to produce privileged information to agencies.402 
This constitutional landscape will be difficult to shape.  Litigants may have greater 
success with the APA, though the Court has been increasingly willing to robustly review 
administrative authority as of late.403  The APA’s provision for challenging agency subpoenas, 
warrants, and other process, 5 U.S.C. § 555(c) and (d), is very rarely used, especially in the past 
few decades.  Litigants could breathe new life into these provisions and help develop case law 
into its meaning.  These provisions are textually not limited by the final-agency-action 
requirement, and so could be used in lieu of, or in addition to, the more broadly available 
provision for challenging agency action, 5 U.S.C. § 706.  Of course, this provision may not be as 
helpful to affected parties as they may like, though, because the Fourth Amendment already 
permits respondents to challenge subpoenas and warrants on the ground that the agency lacks the 
authority to issue them.   
 
398 FTC v. Am. Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 306 (1924). 
399 HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 19, at § 8.1 (5th ed. 2010). 
400 See, e.g., Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2440 (2019). 
401 See Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320 (1978). 
402 See supra note 154. 
403 Gillian Metzger, The Roberts Court and Administrative Law, 2019 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 1  
(“Administrative law today is marked by the legal equivalent of mortal combat, where 
foundational principles are fiercely disputed and basic doctrines are offered up for ‘execution’”).  
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Litigants may consider arguing for a more robust interpretation of § 555(c), which states 
that investigative acts must be “authorized by law.”404  A more respondent-friendly interpretation 
of § 555(c) might accord with the APA House Judiciary Committee Report, which stated that 
APA investigative acts not only had to fall within the agency’s jurisdiction, but also had to 
respect, to the greatest reasonable degree, personal privacy and industry.405  To avail itself of the 
House Judiciary Committee Report language, a party does not have the benefit of case law—
which appears to have cited, but not applied, this language only once.406  But, such party can 
point to the fact that the Supreme Court has cited the House Judiciary Committee Report with 
approval, if not dispositive weight.407  This may be the only way to argue that § 555(c) is a hook 
to challenge an investigation as coercive or an abusive use of prosecutorial discretion, which we 
believe is a reason to curb an agency investigation.   
An affected party could argue that a broad agency investigation impermissibly blurs the 
separation of powers and is thus not authorized by law.  A court could quash the investigatory 
tool on that basis.  This aligns with a recent opinion authored by a Justice in the space of non-
delegation doctrine, where administrative law impacts on significant national issues tie, arguably 
fatally, into broader separation of powers considerations.408   
One semi-efficacious mechanism for entertaining § 555(d) challenges could be the 
judicial imposition of a “clear statement” requirement as a canon of construction.  That is, a 
statute should have to clearly and expressly provide the agency with particular investigatory 
powers—a general delegation of authority for rulemaking or adjudication would not suffice.  On 
the aggregate, this approach would benefit privacy and private interests as courts fail to find 
investigative authority in vague or empty legislative delegations and as Congress’s likely inertia 
or inaction fails to respond. 
A “clear statement” requirement would shift the burden from the respondent to the 
agency.  This approach would be consistent with other “clear statement” canons the Court has 
imposed to protect constitutional values, for example the presumption against retroactivity,409 or 
the presumption in favor of judicial review.410  Requiring such a canon here would be compatible 
with these more recent cases and present an avenue to develop the law in a way that does not 
 
404 5 U.S.C. § 555(c). 
405 H. Rep. 1980 at 264 (May 3, 1946). 
406 See Pac. Westbound Conference v. United States, 332 F.2d 49, 53 n.10 (9th Cir. 1964).  
Davis, supra note 13, at 1134; ASIMOW, supra note 8, at 47 (“[Section 555(c)] seems to add 
nothing to existing law.”); see also FTC v. Am. Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. at 305–06. 
407 See Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. 1668, 1680 (2019); Chrysler Corp. 
v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 313 (1979); see also Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2436 (2019) 
(Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
408 Paul v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 342, 342 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., respecting the denial of 
certiorari)  
409 Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp. 488 U.S. 204 (1988). 
410 Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1905–06 (2020). 
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squarely challenge stare decisis.411  Finally, a statement would heed the Attorney General 
Committee’s warning from almost 80 years ago that the power to procure information “should 
not be withheld” from administrative agencies when needed, “but it should be exercised with 
restraint and with knowledge that the burden imposed is a mounting one.”412   
A court’s careful canvass of the text and legislative history of the agency’s enabling 
statute would help  ensure that Congress in fact intended to give the agency the power of 
investigation.  Affected parties should also try to make more of § 706 challenges.  They could 
advocate for styling an administrative investigation as adjudication (either categorically or on a 
case-by-case basis).  Then, certain requests, such as a massive document search, could be 
classified as a final agency action, especially in the context of adverse consequences for non-
compliance.  The Supreme Court might also conclude that agency investigations, as we have 
defined them—with the elements of coercion and affirmative steps—are APA final agency 
actions.   
That may be difficult in terms of the current § 704 finality case law from the Supreme 
Court and circuit courts.  But as noted earlier, recent Supreme Court decisions have softened 
§ 704’s final action barrier as a response to this problem, including by viewing some closing 
letters as final agency action.413 A closing letter is different from a decision to initiate an 
investigation.  As the Sixth Circuit has held, Hawkes may be distinguishable; if the agency’s 
report or determination had legal consequences like prohibiting the agency from bringing 
enforcement proceedings or denying the respondent legal safe harbor, then it is final agency 
action.  But if further decisionmaking is available, then it may not be final agency action.414 
The extra-statutory “exceptional circumstances” exception to finality might also yield 
helpful new constraints on agency investigations.  Specific investigatory tactics might also be 
final agency action.415  Individuals should keep an eye for when investigatory patterns emerge 
such that the policy or practice could itself be challenged under the APA on an as-applied basis 
to the individual and for failure to comply with rulemaking strictures.  For example, an AI-
assisted forensic review of an entire database might be such a concrete and widespread act by an 
agency as to constitute a substantive rule, for which notice-and-comment rulemaking is required 
and judicial review is available.416 
 
411 This approach would also vindicate Justice Marshall’s concerns in his Heckler v. Chaney 
concurrence about ensuring “administrative fidelity to congressional objectives.”  Heckler v. 
Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 852 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment only). 
412 ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, supra note 47, at 114. 
413 See, e.g., Sackett v. EPA, 566 U.S. 120 (2012) (holding that EPA compliance orders are final 
agency action). 
414 Parsons v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 878 F.3d 162, 170–71 (6th Cir. 2017). 
415 See Veldhoen v. U.S. Coast Guard, 35 F.3d 222, 225 (5th Cir. 1994) (“Normally, the plaintiff 
must await resolution of the agency’s inquiry and challenge the final agency decision.”). 
416 See HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 19, at § 8.1 (chronicling the sometimes hazy line between 
adjudications and rules, but noting that being addressed to unnamed classes of individuals not 
presently before the agency is a hallmark of rules). 
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Second, individuals and entities should avail themselves of the political process.  An 
agency investigation presumably ought to be typically centered around some discrete body of 
individuals.  The more individuals targeted by an agency, the more effectively those individuals 
have access to political machinery to resolve an issue.  The Internal Revenue Service scandal 
involving the targeting of political-sounding groups seeking tax-exempt status riled enough 
groups and representatives that the agency settled a lawsuit and apologized, and its commissioner 
resigned.  But our concern is with the absence of countermajoritarian protections, the rights of 
the individual or near-individual. 
Third, Congress should consider legislative fixes.  We recognize the political reality that 
prospective legislation of this sort presents for actual passage into law is a major challenge.  The 
impetus for this might be analogous to when Congress let the independent counsel statute417 
lapse.  The history suggests that the law’s critics of both parties complained that the independent 
counsel wasted taxpayer money while pursuing offenses short of “high crimes and 
misdemeanors” and while trampling on individual rights.418  Then-Deputy Attorney General Eric 
H. Holder, Jr., appears to have testified that a continuation of the special counsel statute was 
unnecessary, as the Department of Justice can investigate most crimes itself.419  Thus, Congress 
would need to free itself of this thinking if it were to consider that agencies might not, in fact, be 
the best guards of their own investigatory behavior. 
Specifically, Congress could go beyond the minimum requirements of Fourth 
Amendment or other constitutional provisions.  Congress could enshrine substantive objections 
or new procedural vehicles into the APA.  Although no member appears to have introduced a bill 
on the subject in recent Congresses, the Administrative Conference of the United States 
(“ACUS”) could be a model.  In December 2016, the Adjudication Committee of ACUS 
recommended new procedures for evidentiary hearings not required by the APA that are presided 
over by administrative law judges.420  Of note, ACUS recommended: 
 Agencies should separate their internal functions.  The personnel who investigate, 
prosecute, and advocate should not also serve an adjudicatory function421   
 Agencies should engage in discovery with rules closer to those contained in the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, including an agency showing of need and cost justification.422  
(We add requiring the agencies to adhere to “proportionality,” such as used in Federal 
 
417 28 U.S.C. §§ 591–599 (1994) (expired). 
418 David Stout & David Johnston, Justice Officials to Call for End to Counsel Law, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 2, 1999. 
419 Id. 
420 ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, EVIDENTIARY HEARINGS NOT 
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Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b),423 could help properly focus their investigative acts, 
particularly where the information sought may be primarily electronically stored.) 
 Agencies with subpoena or other process power fully detail their subpoena practice.424 
 Agencies should develop rules of evidence.425 
 Agency should provide written or transcribable decisions, and decisions should be made 
precedential.426 
ACUS’s recommendations appear to be sound, or at least are good templates for the sort 
of reform that Congress should consider to increase transparency in the civil administrative 
investigation process. 
The First Branch could amend agencies’ organic statutes to clarify or limit their 
investigatory authorities to ensure they are in compliance with congressional intent and are well-
proportioned to the agency’s mission.  Congress could refocus agency priorities by explicitly 
separating compensation and advancement metrics from violation-centered outcomes.  That is, 
agency employees or the agency as a whole should not receive incentives for pursuing 
investigations that result in enforcement actions.  Congress should consider limiting an agency’s 
ability to initiate additional investigations after commencing adjudication, to prevent the pressure 
of additional investigations from coercing settlement or acquiescence. 
 Relatedly, the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), which provides for attorneys’ fees 
to certain prevailing private parties in “civil actions” against the federal government, could be 
amended.427  The APA has a similar provision for prevailing parties in adversary 
adjudications.428  These provisions could explicitly apply to § 555(d) challenges of agency 
investigatory tools.  Congress could expand EAJA accessibility for attorney’s costs and fees 
associated with pre-litigation investigations and enforcement actions.429 
 Congress could also reform the oversight process; if regulated entities are not able to hold 
overzealous investigating agencies accountable, then other government actors should be able to.  
The Department of Justice has commended judicial review of administrative subpoenas, saying, 
“judicial involvement in enforcement ensures a good degree of fairness.”430  Funding more 
inspectors general or expanding their powers might positively impact the oversight process.431  
Congress could also require agencies to report more data on investigations they have begun, 
 
423 FED R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
424 ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 4201. 
425 Id. 
426 Id. 
427 28 U.S.C. § 2412. 
428 5 U.S.C. § 504. 
429 The latest edition of the EAJA model rules by ACUS, for what it is worth, do not include any 
sort of expansion.  See ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 431. 
430 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE USE OF ADMINISTRATIVE SUBPOENA AUTHORITIES BY 
EXECUTIVE BRANCH AGENCIES AND ENTITIES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY 
apps. (2002), https://www.justice.gov/archive/olp/rpt_to_congress.htm#4. 
431 Cuéllar, supra note 79, at 299. 
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including the steps undertaken in pursuit of the investigation and the eventual result of the 
investigation.  Even if that information is not made public, simply having this information would 
better enable Congress—and agency heads—to determine whether agency investigators are 
acting in accordance with the Constitution, the organic statute, and principles of good 
governance. 
 Finally, agencies themselves could self-regulate and impose durable constraints on 
themselves through the rulemaking process.  Regulations defining the scope of an agency’s 
investigation, and creating procedural opportunities for responding parties to contest an 
investigation’s scope or methods, are not unheard of.  For example, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission has a regulation that provides, “Persons who become involved in . . . [SEC] 
investigations may . . . submit a written statement to the Commission setting forth their interests 
and position in regard to the subject matter of the investigation.”432   
Of course, an agency would seem to have little incentive to voluntarily make rules 
reining in its investigative authority.  This is especially so given the costs to the agency of even 
making the rule.  However, there is historical precedent; agencies, especially before the APA 
was enacted, not infrequently developed standards of conduct which they committed to follow.433  
Even if an agency does not want to self-regulate, respondents have at least two possible routes to 
pressure the agency to do so.  Respondents could submit comments urging the adopting of self-
scoping rules when the agency is considering related rules.  Respondents could also petition the 
agency to make these rules under the APA’s petition procedure.434  This would help craft new 
equipment with which to detect and study the unknown nuances of administrative investigations. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The field of administrative investigations is broad and under-researched.  This Article 
endeavors to identify and to establish a framework to explore the space with the knowledge that 
its depths lie unknown.  We have concluded that each branch of federal government that has 
enabled administrative investigations to flourish unbounded can take discrete steps to bring them 
back to constitutional alignment.   
Given the abuses agencies have engaged in and the potential for new technologies to 
expand how investigations proceed, it is important that such controls be implemented in the near 
future.  Congress, with its plenary primacy on the policy and powers of the administrative state, 
ought to take first chair to reform the Administrative Procedure Act.  Congress should establish 
positive procedures that investigating agencies must follow and explicitly create a cause of 
action for individuals and entities of the regulated public to access the courts for inappropriate 
exercise of administrative investigative power.  The executive branch should establish durable 
controls of self-restraint so that the American people are treated fairly when agencies act under 
Article II to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”435  The Judiciary should remedy its 
 
432 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(c). 
433 Cuéllar, supra note 20, at 1409–10. 
434 5 U.S.C. § 553(e). 
435 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 5. 
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errors in United States v. Morton Salt Co. and Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling436 to 
enforce normative constitutional constraints on administrative behavior.  It should reassess the 
procedural and substantive protections of the APA in line with its legislative history.   
Lastly, the American public should be more cognizant of their lack of rights in the face of 
administrative investigative power and take steps politically and legally to press for their 
restoration, especially in the face of unchecked investigations like those against LabMD.  It is 
likely that the march of technology and the application of cutting-edge artificial intelligence 
strands like machine learning and deep learning to administrative investigations will serve as a 
catalyst for these actions.  Until then, American society will slowly lose more of their rights. 
 
436 United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950); Okla. Press Pub’g Co. v. 
Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 209 (1946); see also United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 359 (1989). 
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